Tompkins v. Clay St. R.R.

California Supreme Court Nov 28, 1884 No. No. 8,509Published

Before: McKinstry

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Holding. A plaintiff who receives compensation from one of two joint tortfeasors in settlement of a pending action is barred from recovering against the other, as the law presumes the settlement constitutes full satisfaction for the injury. Furthermore, a defendant is entitled to a specific jury instruction that the mere occurrence of an injury does not create a presumption of negligence against them.

Issues

Whether a plaintiff who receives compensation from one joint tortfeasor in settlement of a pending action is barred from recovering against the other.
Whether the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that the mere fact of injury does not create a presumption of negligence against the defendant.

Disposition. reversed and remanded

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“The appellant was entitled to have the attention of the jury called to the point, that, in considering the evidence, the mere circumstance that plaintiff had been injured as a result of the collision did not create a presumption of negligence”

“The plaintiff must be held to have received from the Sutter Street Company satisfaction for the very same injuries for which she obtained a judgment against the appellant.”

“Therefore, if he receives the satisfaction voluntarily made by one, that is a bar as to all.”

Synopsis

Carriers of Passengers—Collision—Parties.—When a collision of two street cars is occasioned by the negligence of the managers of both vehicles, a passenger upon either car who is injured by the collision may recover damages against the proprietor of either or both. Where both proprietors are sued, the plaintiff may dismiss as to either, and if it turn out at the trial that one proprietor was not guilty of negligence, he may, on sufficient evidence, take a verdict against the other.

Id.—Negligence—Presumftion.—In an action by a passenger against two carriers of passengers, for damages caused by a collision, no presumption of negligence arises from the mere fact of the injury, as against the proprietor of the vehicle not occupied by the plaintiff.

Id.—Release of One Carrier—Estoppel.—When a passenger injured by a collision brings an action against the proprietors of both vehicles, a release of one of the defendants, who was a party in fault, in consideration of a sum of money paid to the plaintiff, operates as a release of both of the defendants. The plaintiff is estopped from asserting that the party to whom the release was given was not in fault, and not liable for the injury.

McKinstry, J. -A car of the Clay Street Hill Company collided with a car of the Sutter Street Railroad Company, at the crossing of Clay and Polk Streets, San Francisco. Plaintiff, a passenger in the car of the latter company, was thrown from her seat and injured. The complaint charges neglect on the part of both companies. Plaintiff recovered damages of the Clay Street Company, and the appeal is by that company.

In Pennsylvania, it seems to have been held that when a passenger on a carrier vehicle is injured by a collision resulting from the mutual negligence of those in charge of it and another party, the carrier alone must answer for the injury. (Lockhart v. Lichtenthaler, 10 Wright, 151; Phila. and R. Railroad Company v. Boyer, 97 Pa. St. 100.) But the weight of authority is otherwise, and is to the effect that, if the negligence of the managers of both-vehicles contributes to the injury, the party injured may recover from the proprietors of either or both. (Wharton, Law of Negligence, 395, and cases cited.) Where both are sued, the plaintiff may ordinarily dismiss as to either; and, if it turn out at the trial that one was not guilty of negligence, he may, on sufficient evidence, take a verdict against the other.

The court below charged the jury : “In civil cases (and this is a civil case), the affirmative of the issue must be proved; and [165]when the evidence is contradictory, your decision must be made according to the preponderance of the evidence.” But the court refused to charge, at the request of defendant, the Clay Street Hill Railroad Company: “If you find from the evidence that the plaintiff was a passenger on the street car of the defendant, the Sutter Street Railroad Company, then I instruct you that no presumption of negligence, as against the Clay Street Hill Railroad Company, arises from the fact of the injury, and that the plaintiff must show, by a preponderance of the testimony, that "the defendant, the Clay Street Railroad Company, was guilty of negligence.”

The appellant was entitled to have the attention of the jury called to the point, that, in considering the evidence, the mere circumstance that plaintiff had been injured as a result of the collision did not create a presumption of negligence on appellant’s part. The general charge, to the effect that the plaintiff must make out her own case by a preponderance of evidence, was not the equivalent of the specific instruction requested.

The defendant, the Clay Street Railroad Company, also asked the court to charge:

Tompkins v. Clay St. R.R.

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