Reclamation Dist. No. 108 v. Hagar
Before: McKee, McKinstry, Myrick, Sharpstein, Thornton
Synopsis
Swamp Lands—Reclamation Districts—Constitutional Law.—The statutes of this State, providing for the formation of s wamp land reclamation districts, are not in conflict with the provision of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which declares that no State shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.
Id.—Assessment—Apportionment.—The mode of assessment is a matter for the legislature, and the courts will not Interfere on the ground of an improper apportionment or inequality of burden or benefit, unless there is a palpable violation of private rights.
Id.—Assessment, How Payable—Gold Coin — Interest —An assessment may be made payable in gold coin, and interest may be collected thereon.
Id.—Additional Assessment.—Where the original assessment proves inadequate, an additional assessment may be made.
Id.—Enforcing Assessment—Counsel Fees—Appropriation of Eund.—It is competent for the trustees of a reclamation district to appropriate a portion of the fund arising from an assessment to the payment of special counsel employed to enforce its collection.
Id,—Formation of District—Lands in Different Counties.—The board of supervisors of a county may be empowered by the legislature to include within a reclamation district lands situated in another county.
Id.—Action to Enforce Assessment—Parties—Judgment.—In an action to enforce an assessment for the reclamation of swamp lands, the reclamation district is the real party in interest; and where the action is brought in the name of the district, a judgment in its favor, if otherwise valid, will not be reversed on the ground that the action should have been brought in the name of the people of the State.
Id.—Arkansas Act.—It is not a defense to an action to recover an assessment for reclamation purposes, that the State, by accepting the grant under the Arkansas Act, assumed the burden of reclaiming the land, and therefore could not impose it upon the grante'es of the State.
Opinion — Sharpstein
Sharpstein, J. This action was brought to recover of the defendant an assessment levied upon his land for reclamation.
1. The statutes of this State relating to the formation of reclamation districts, and the levying of assessments, require that upon the presentation of a petition, setting forth a description of the lands of which it is desirec^to have the district formed, with the names of the owners (if known), notice of the hearing shall be given by publication. After the formation of the district, no other or further notice to owners is required to be given; but proceedings are to be had for the election of trustees, making of by-laws, appointment of commissioners, the estimate of works and their cost, and the assessment of such cost upon the lands of the district; and no time, place or manner is named for any opposition to be made. If an assessment remains unpaid, provision was made for the bringing of an action against the delinquent owner. The appellant claims that the statutes are in conflict with the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution of the United States. Upon this point, the Supreme Court of the United States and this Court have decided adversely to the appellant. (Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97; Hager v. Rec. Dist. No. 108, 111 U. S. 701; Rec. Dist. No. 3 v. Goldman, 65 Cal. 635.)
2. Whether or riot the mode of assessment was in accordance with proper apportionment, or equality of burden or benefit, was for the consideration of the legislative department, in the absence of a palpable violation of private rights. (Hagar v. Rec. Dist. No. 108, 111 U. S. 701.) In the case before us, we cannot say that the burdens to be borne were not equal in proportion to benefits.
3. It is claimed that the law authorizing the assessment is in violation of section 10, article i, of the Constitution of the United States, forbidding the passage of any law impairing the obligation of contracts, on the ground that the State, in accepting the grant under the “ Arkansas Act,” assumed the burden of reclaiming the land, and cannot impose this burden upon its grantees. The case of Hagar v. Rec. Dist. No. 108, supra, holds the contrary.
4. There is nothing in the point that the assessment is sought to be enforced in gold coin. (Hager v. Rec. Dist. No. 108, supra.)
[565]
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