Boorman v. City of Santa Barbara

The Court. 1. The Act of March 26, 1878 (Stats. 1877—78, p. 777), authorizes the common council of the city of Santa Barbara to lay out, etc., any one street between certain termini, upon presentation of a petition signed by the owners representing a majority of the frontage “upon the proposed improvement.” The act does not contemplate the presentation in one petition of a prayer or demand for the improvement or laying out of more than one street, nor empower the council “to open, extend, widen, straighten, or close up” a great number of streets in one proceeding.

Such is not the ordinary meaning of the language of the act, and a construction which would give legality to proceedings like those reviewed by the Superior Court herein would lead to complications well illustrated by the history of the present case.

2. Even if it should be conceded that the act authorizes the closing of a number of streets greater than one, and the opening, or straightening, or widening of other streets, in one proceeding, it requires a petition to be presented, signed by owners of a majority of the frontage upon each separate street. Otherwise it might happen that a street would be opened against the wish of every one of the owners of property fronting on that street.

• 3. The power of the council to act depended upon .the presentation of a petition such as the act requires.

4. "We agree with the court below that the Act of March 26, 1878, is unconstitutional and void. It provides for no process [315]or notice to be served upon the persons whose property is to be charged with assessments. The only provision as to notice is: “The commissioners shall give notice of the time and place where they will proceed to examine the property to be effected by such improvements, by an advertisement in one newspaper published in said city, such time not to be more than ten days after the day when said notice shall first be published.” (§ 1.) Conceding (for the purposes of this opinion only), that a time not more than ten days must be at least one day—and that a law which provided for but one day’s publication of notice would not be held obnoxious to the objection that it practically deprives the citizen of all notice—the act we are analyzing provides for no notice at all addressed to any particular person or class of persons, or which would inform any particular person that, on failure of appearance, any burden would be imposed upon him, or his property.