People v. McDowell

Myrick, J. The testimony of the witness Hicks as to the slung-shot in the possession of the defendant, and as to the statement made by defendant, was relevant and material, because there was evidence tending to show that the wounds inflicted upon the person of deceased might have been caused by such an implement. The statements of the witnesses Vfixon Rice and Cheatham, as to the place where the deceased was supposed to have been killed, were for the purpose, merely, of locating the spot, as foundation for further examination, and was so stated. [468]While there are certain portions of the charge of the court below which, segregated, are objectionable, still when taken in connection with the context, as they must be, we think it cannot be fairly said that there was on the part of the court any invasion of the province of the jury.

Judgment and order affirmed.

Morrisox, C. J., Boss, J., McKee, J., McKihstby, J., and Thorxtox, J., concurred.

Sharpstein, J., dissenting. I dissent. In one part of the charge of the court this language occurs:—

“ The guilt of the prisoner rests upon evidence of his own declarations, also evidence tending to show that the dead body of the deceased was found with marks of violence and wounds upon it, and other circumstances tending to connect the defendant with the cause of her death.

“ The conclusion that the prisoner is the person who committed the murder, from all the facts and circumstances surrounding the killing, is a result of a process of reasoning which men exercise in almost every department of society, and in the practical affairs of life and experience.”

If we assume, as I think we must, that the jury attached to this language the meaning which men ordinarily attach to it, I cannot see how we can escape the conclusion that the appellant is entitled to a new trial.

The Constitution (art. vii. § 19) declares that “judges shall not charge juries with respect to matters of fact, but may state the evidence and declare the law.”