Upham v. Hosking
Before: Thornton
Synopsis
Appeal by defendant from the judgment of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District in and for the County of Solano, and from an order denying a motion for a new trial. Wallace, J.
Action of ejectment. The evidence as to the house claimed to have been reserved in the deed, and from one Brown to the plaintiff, was as follows:
Testimony of C. K. Marshall:
“Question. You know the end of the house that extends over into the swamp land?
“Answer. Yes, sir.
“Q. Is that building the same structure as the wharf itself—a body of piles altogether—a wharf on portion and a house on portion, altogether?
“A. It is built on piles.
“Q. The house joins the wharf itself ?
“A. Yes, sir.
“Q. The house and wharf are all together, are they not?
“A. They are both on piles right together.
“Q. Joined right together?
“A. Yes, sir; butt up together.
“Q. It does not extend any further on the wharf now—or how v it—than then?
“A. No, sir.
“Q. It is precisely as built in 1861, as far as the foundation is concerned?
“A. Yes, sir.”
The Court below found that the land included in the plaintiff’s location and in the patent to him is not and never has been situated within two miles of any town whatever. This finding was attacked by the defendant on the ground that it was within two miles of a place called and known as Collins-ville, and that Collinsville was a town. The evidence relied on to show that Collinsville was a town, was as follows: 1. An Act of the Legislature of March 30,1868, entitled “an Act to authorize the establishment of a steam ferry between Collinsville in Solano County and New York Landing and Antioch in Contra Costa County.” 2. In the patent from the State to the plaintiff, the “ bridge leading on to Collinsville wharf” is mentioned as one of the calls in the description of the land. 3. In the deed of conveyance from Brown to the plaintiff, he, the plaintiff, is described as “ of Collinsville.” 4. One of the witnesses (Hooper) testified that between the years 1867 and 1876, considerable business was done at and over the wharf, and that a portion of that time several steamers occasionally landed there. 5. Another witness (Charles J. Collins) testified that after the building of the wharf in 1861, “the town was named Collinsville after that; about that time we applied for a post-office there, and they named it Collinsville.” Q. “Was there a post-office there at that time or soon after?” A. “Soon after.” 6. Another witness (Turner) testified that he ran a ferry from Antioch to Collinsville. 7. Another witness (Marshall) testified that his home since 1853 had been in Collinsville, but at the time of the trial he was County Recorder and lived in Fairfield.
Thornton, J.: Action to recover possession of certain lands described in the complaint, situate in the County of Solano. The plaintiff had judgment. Defendant moved for a new trial, which was denied, and he prosecutes this appeal from the judgment and order just mentioned.
As to a portion of the land sued for (part of Swamp Land Survey No. 17), on which was a portion of a building, it is admitted that the title was in one Brown, and that the conveyance from him to plaintiff passed to the latter Brown’s title to that portion of the lot which was covered by the building, unless excluded from the operation of the conveyance by a reservation contained in it of “the wharf and wharf franchises.” On the premises in controversy was a wharf and a part of the building above mentioned.
It is contended here that this building constituted a portion of the wharf, and was embraced in the reservation aforesaid, and, therefore, did not pass to the plaintiff under Brown’s conveyance.
On an examination of the evidence, we are of opinion that this contention is untenable, that the building did not constitute a part of the wharf, and was not, therefore, reserved from the operation of the deed.
As to the remaining portion of the premises sued for, the [256]defendant claimed under a grant on certain conditions made to one Collins, in which grant it was provided that on failure to comply with the conditions, all the rights granted by the Act should become forfeited to the State. The Court below found and held that there had not been a compliance with the terms of the grant, and that all rights under the Act had been forfeited to the State before the accrual of the title claimed by plaintiff. This matter will be better understood from the findings of the Court in regard thereto. They are as follows:
“As to the affirmative matter alleged in defendant’s answer, the Court finds: That a private statute of the State of California was enacted by the Legislature thereof entitled and approved as alleged in said answer, the whole of which statute is contained in the printed statutes of California for the year 1861, on page 300 thereof. That by the terms thereof there was granted to one C. J. Collins, his associates and assigns, for the term of twenty years from the date of May 6, 1861, the right to establish a ferry across the upper end of Suisun Bay, from the point known on Ringold’s map of Suisun Bay as 'Point Collberg’ in Solano County, to a place known as New York, in Contra Costa County, and said parties were also authorized to construct a wharf at each of the landing places of said ferry, one in Solano County and one in Contra Costa County, which wharves were required by said Act to be substantially built, of such materials and of such dimensions as to make said wharves sufficient for all the purposes of a steam ferry as well as for the local business of the two points; and from time to time said wharves were required to be enlarged as the commerce of the places might require.
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