Wilson v. Southern Pacific Railroad
Before: McKee
Synopsis
Appeal from a judgment against the defendant in the Superior Court of the County of San Benito, and from an order denying a motion for new trial. Breen, J.
Action against the defendant as warehouseman for negligence. On the thirty-first day of October, 1875, the plaintiff owned and stored with the defendant, in its warehouse at Hollister, in the County of San Benito, sixty-four bales of wool, weighing in the aggregate twenty-two thousand two hundred and seventy-five pounds. On January 5, 1876, the warehouse was consumed by fire and all the wool was burned, except three bales saved uninjured, and about three hundred and seventy pounds in a damaged condition.
There was evidence showing or tending to show that the wool at the time it was burnt was worth thirteen cents a pound, and that the three hundred and seventy pounds after the fire were worth three or four cents a pound. The action was tried before a jury, in April, 1880, and the verdict was for the plaintiff in the sum of three thousand five hundred and eighty-nine dollars and seventy-one cents. As a part of the cause of action the complaint alleged that the defendant was a railroad corporation, duly incorporated, and at the several dates mentioned in the complaint owned and operated a railroad in the County of San Benito, which road ran through the town of Hollister. A motion was made by the defendant in the Court below to strike out all of these allegations, on the ground that they were irrelevant, immaterial, and redundant. The motion was denied, and the defendant presented and filed its bill of exceptions.
On the trial the Court below, on its own motion, after giving the instructions asked. , by defendant, gave with other instructions the following: “In this ease the principal question you will have to determine is this: Was the defendant or its servants guilty of culpable negligence in respect to the burning of the wool ? This question you will have to determine from the proofs and circumstances of this ease, measured, as they must be, by rules of law, as you have laid down to you.
“As an abstract principle it is somewhat difficult to locate exactly the point where due care ends and culpable negligence begins; but the line must be drawn somewhere.
“In some cases the law exacts the utmost diligence and care, while in others the rigor of the rule is relaxed, as, for instance, if a warehouseman received for safe keeping or storage a valuable package, known to contain diamonds, he would not be permitted to excuse himself for .their loss by showing that he had exercised the same degree of care or diligence in protecting them from loss, as he and ordinarily prudent and careful warehousemen were in the habit of bestowing on less valuable and heavier articles of merchandise, such as are generally committed to the care of warehousemen; so the locality and other surrounding circumstances are frequently important factors to be considered by a jury in actions of this kind. By way of illustration I will say that, at the present time, the law would exact from a warehouseman doing business in a populous city like San Francisco, a greater degree of care and circumspection than from one doing business in a rural town like Hollister; because, judging from the public acts and utterances of certain individuals, it would be reasonable to infer that there is a more disturbed and feverish social condition there than here, and, consequently, the danger to property from riotous acts would be more imminent in the city than in the country; and the person of ordinary care and prudence would be expected to govern himself accordingly, and increase his precautions against loss that might occur from the condition just referred to.
McKee, J.: The appeal in this case comes from a judgment and order denying the motion of appellant for a new trial in an action to recover damages for the destruction of certain property of the respondent, by a fire caused, as alleged, by the negligence of-the appellant and its employees in conducting and managing its warehouse in which the property had been stored.
The case was tried by the Court with a jury, and a verdict was rendered against the appellant. If there was any evidence to warrant the verdict we can not review it on appeal. It is conclusive upon us, not only on the question of negligence, but upon all the allegations in the complaint material to recovery in the action. (Algier v. Steamer Marie, 14 Cal. 167; Brown v. Brown, 41 id. 88; Trenor v. C. P. R. R. Co., 50 id. 222.) It is, however, contended that there was no evidence to sustain the verdict, and that the Court below erred in denying a motion for a nonsuit.
It was proved on the trial that the respondent had stored in the appellant’s warehouse sixty-four bales of wool of a certain value per pound, which, on demand and tender of the storage due upon it, the appellant refused to deliver to the [172]respondent, assigning, as a reason, that the warehouse and all it contained, except about three bales of wool, which were returned to him, had been consumed by fire.
A prima facie ease of negligence is made out against a warehouseman, who refuses to deliver property stored with him, upon proof of demand and refusal. Upon such proof alone the burden is on him to account for the property; otherwise he shall be deemed to have converted it to his own use. But if it appears that the property, when demanded, was consumed by fire, the burden of proof is then on the bailor to show that the fire was the- result of the negligence of the warehouseman. (Harris v. Packwood, 3 Taunt. 264; Beardslee v. Richardson, 11 Wend. 26; Browne v. Johnson, 29 Tex. 43; Lamb v. Camden and Amboy R. R. Co., 46 N. Y. 271; Jackson v. Sac. Val. R. R. Co., 23 Cal. 269.)
The negligence of the appellant, as the proximate cause of the loss of the property by fire, thus became the essential fact to recovery; and the burden of proof was upon the plaintiff in the action. It was incumbent on him to prove that the defendant had, by some act of omission, violated some duty, by reason of which the fire originated; or that some negligence or want of care, such as a prudent man would take under similar circumstances of his own property, caused or permitted, or contributed to cause or permit, the fire by which the property was destroyed.
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