Welton v. Cook

California Supreme Court Oct 3, 1882 No. No. 7,006Published

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Holding. A purchaser of property who acquires title from a plaintiff during the pendency of a quiet title action is bound by the final judgment against his grantor, regardless of whether the defendants filed a separate notice of lis pendens for their affirmative claims.

Issues

Whether a purchaser of property pendente lite is bound by a judgment against his grantor when the purchaser had notice of the pending litigation via the grantor's lis pendens.
Whether the failure of defendants to file a notice of lis pendens for their affirmative relief prevents a judgment in their favor from binding a purchaser from the plaintiff.

Disposition. reversed and remanded

Synopsis

Notice of Action—Action to Quiet Title—Estoppel bt Judgment.— In a former action to quiet title by one L. against the plaintiffs W. et al., notice of action was given by the plaintiff L. but none was given by W. et al., the defendants therein. In that action in the Court below L. had judgment, but on appeal to the Supreme Court the judgment was reversed and judgment ordered to be entered for the defendant W. et al., and such judgment was accordingly entered May 6, 1874. Pending.that action L. conveyed the premises to Marcus M. Cook, defendant in the present action, which was commenced August 12, 1876, the defendant M. M. C. claiming title and asking that his title be quieted—his co-defendant P. A. C. claiming as mortgagor of M. M. C. After judgment in the former action of L. v. 17. ei al., under a writ of possession, W. et al. were placed in possession; but in the present action the Court below also found that C. in May, 1866, went into possession under his deed from L. and ■ without other title had since that date to the dato of the findings in. December, 1879, held the possession adversely.

Held : 1. By the notice of action filed by L. in the former action his grantee (Cook, defendant here) had notice that while L. claimed to be the owner of the premises, the defendants W. et al. claimed an interest therein adverse to him, and that the Court was asked to adjudicate upon the respective claims. 2. Admitting (which the Court does not) in such case, W. et al. were bound to file a notice of their claims for affirmative relief, the judgment of the Court that L. had no title was as much binding upon Cook, his grantee, as it was or would have been on L. himself.

Effect of Reheaeing on Eobmeb Opinion.—After the first opinion in Corwin v. Hensley, 43 Cal. 260, was filed, a rehearing was granted, and in the judgment on rehearing the effect of the Us pendens filed by Corwin was expressly omitted from determination.

Held: The first opinion in that case is not an adjudication upon the point as to the effect of such Us pendens.

The Court: In 1864, one Learned commenced an action against the plaintiffs herein and others, claiming to be the owner of the premises in controversy, alleging that the defendants therein (among whom were the plaintiffs here) claimed an interest in the premises adverse to him, and asked that his title be quieted. Learned filed a notice of the pendency of the action. The defendants in that action answered, alleging themselves to be the owners in fee, and prayed that the title be quieted as against their adversary, but they did not file any notice of the pendency of the action. Learned had judgment as prayed for, but on appeal this Court reversed the judgment and directed a judgment to be entered for the defendants as prayed for by them. Judgment was accordingly entered May 6,1874.

[486]Pending that action, to wit, May 7,1866, Learned conveyed the premises to Marcus M. Cook, defendant here. The deed contained a covenant of warranty “against all claims of John K. Moore and Merritt Welton et al.” Merritt Welton was one of the defendants in that action.

The action now before us, commenced August 12,1875, was brought to quiet, the title of the plaintiffs to the premises, the plaintiffs alleging themselves to be the owners in fee, and defendants claim an interest adverse to them. The defendant M. M. Cook answers, claiming that he is the owner, and asks that his title be quieted. The defendant P. A. Cook claims as incumbrancer of his co-defendant.

The Court below found the facts as above stated, and also the following: That after the judgment in the former suit, a writ for the possession of the premises was issued, and was executed by the Sheriff on the ninth day of May, 1874, by placing the Weltons in possession of the lot in controversy; and the Court also found that the defendant M. M. Cook went into possession of the premises on the seventh of May, 1866, the date of his deed from Learned, under that deed; that he neither has nor claims any title except such as he obtained by that deed or such as he may have acquired by the statute of limitations, and that he had held the possession adversely from the date of his entry under the deed to the date of the findings, December 11, 1879. The conclusion of law drawn by the Court was that plaintiff’s cause of action was barred by the statute of limitations, and judgment was accordingly rendered for defendants.

The defendant M. M. Cook claims that he is unaffected by the Us pendens filed by the plaintiff (his grantor) in the former suit, and that as the defendants therein filed no Us pendens giving notice of the affimative relief asked by them, he is not bound by the judgment in their favor. By the Us pendens filed by the plaintiff (Learned) in that action, his grantee (Cook, defendant here) had notice that while he, Learned, claimed to be the rightful owner of the premises, the defendants, Weltons, claimed an interest therein adverse to him, and that the Court was asked to adjudicate upon the respective claims; and admitting (which we do not) that in such case the Weltons were bound to file a notice of their

Welton v. Cook

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