Olivas v. Olivas
Before: Morrison
Synopsis
Constructive Trust*—Fraud—Reformation of Deed—Distribution of Estate of Deceased Person—Pretermitido Children—Will—Sufficiency of Evidence to Sustain Finding.—0., by Ms will, demised and bequeathed all his estate to his widow, but did not mention in his will the names of his children. After his death, pending proceedings for the final distribution of his estate, the children executed to the widow a deed of conveyance of all their interest in the estate, and subsequently all of the estate was distributed by the Probate Court to her. In an action by two of the children against the widow, to establish a trust in their favor in certain real property distributed to her, the Court found that the deed was procured by false and fraudulent representations as to its contents, by which they were led to believe that it was a conveyance for the life of the defendant only, and also by promises of the defendant as to certain future advances, which the defendant failed to keep; and rendered judgment for plaintiffs.
Held: 1. The findings of the Court are sustained by the testimony of at least two witnesses, and it was the exclusive province of the trial Court to pass upon the credibility of the witnesses.
2. The Court did not err in not rendering a decree to reform the deed so as to make it express the intention of the parties. The gravamen of the complaint is fraud practiced by the appellant in obtaining the execution of the instrument, coupled with the additional averment that the defendant has wholly neglected to comply with the terms and conditions upon which the deed was executed. The facts found were sufficient to justify the Court in making the decree complained of, which in effect sets aside and cancels the deed.
3. The fact that the fraud complained of was discovered in time for plaintiffs to have availed themselves of it in the Probate Court does not affect their right to relief in a Court of Equity. It may be admitted that they could have successfully opposed the order of distribution in the Probate Court, but it does not follow that they did not have a right to go into-equity for the purpose of setting the deed aside on the ground of fraud.
Morrison, C. J.: This was a proceeding to establish a trust in favor of the plaintiffs, and against the defendant, in certain property situate in the county of Ventura. The principal facts out of which it is claimed the trust arises are fully set out in- the findings of the Court, and to these findings we will refer.
The plaintiffs are two of the children and the defendant is the widow of the late Raymundo Olivas, who died on the twenty-first of February, 1879, and who was, at the time of his death, seised of an estate valued- at fifty thousand dollars, or thereabouts. On the twenty-ninth of March, 1879, the last will and testament of Raymundo Olivas was admitted to probate in the Probate Court of Ventura County, and on the twentieth of October, 1880, a final order of distribution of the estate was made by the Court. By his will the deceased devised and bequeathed all of his estate, of every character, to the defendant, and did not therein mention the name or names of any of his children. On the seventeenth of March, 1880, within one year after the probate of the will and before the order of distribution was made, the plaintiffs filed their petitions in the Superior Court (which had succeeded to the jurisdiction of the former Probate Court of Ventura County), praying for a revocation of the probate of the will, and opposing a distribution of the estate in accordance with the terms of the will, on the ground that the testator has neglected to make any provision for them, or to mention them in his will, and the defendant was duly cited to appear and answer said petition. The Court then finds:
“ VI. That upon the day fixed by said ¡Superior Court for the hearing of said contest and said opposition, the defendant sought out plaintiff Refugia, and requested and begged her not to proceed with her said contest to revoke the probate of said will, and to withdraw her opposition to the distribution of the estate of her father to the defendant; and then and there proposed to and promised said plaintiff Refugia, that if she would withdraw her contest and opposition to distribution, and would execute, acknowledge, and deliver to her, defendant, a deed conveying to defendant her interest in said estate, for and during the life of defendant, reserving to her[384]self (plaintiff) the reversionary interest therein, that she, plaintiff, should be entitled to and should have her proper share and proportion in the rents and profits of said estate, for her support during the life of defendant; and as a further consideration and inducement, defendant also agreeing to advance immediately to plaintiff Refugia, the sum of five hundred dollars, with which to buy her a home, or to purchase for her a house and lot in the town of San Buenaventura.”
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