Younger v. Pagles

California Supreme Court May 29, 1882 No. No. 6,922Published

Before: McKinstry, Myrick

AI Brief

AI-generated · verify before citing

Holding. An order of a District Court purporting to dismiss an appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court is void if the appeal remains pending, and such an order cannot be presumed valid without evidence of a mandate or dismissal from the appellate court. Furthermore, under the Act of 1863, a claimant under a Spanish or Mexican grant has five years from the Act's passage to commence an action if the title has not been finally confirmed.

Issues

Whether an order of a District Court dismissing an appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court is valid without evidence of a mandate or dismissal from the appellate court.
Whether the plaintiff's action for the recovery of real property was barred by the statute of limitations under the Act of 1863.

Disposition. reversed

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“The order of the District Court was absolutely void if the appeal to the Supreme Court was pending when the order was made, and the conclusive presumption is, that the appeal is still pending”

“Every person claiming under a Spanish or Mexican grant or title, was given full five years after the Act of 1863 took effect, to bring his action, unless the grant or title was “ finally confirmed” more than five years before the Act of 1863”

Synopsis

Ejectment—Mexican Grant—Survey under the Act of June 14, I860— Final Confirmation—Appeal — Presumption — Jurisdiction of United States District Court—Statute of Limitations—Patent— Pre-emption.—In an action of ejectment, the facts as found by the Court were in substance as follows: The land in controversy is within the limits of a Mexican grant to the predecessors in title of the plaintiff, approved by the Departmental Assembly, and of which the juridical possession has been delivered. The claim was duly presented and confirmed by the Land Commissioner and the United States District Court. An appeal was taken to the Supreme Court, but afterwards (in the year 1857), the District Court made an order dismissing the same. In the year 1858, the grant was surveyed by the United States Surveyor General, so as to include the premises in controversy; but in 1861, the survey not having been previously approved, the Surveyor General altered the northern boundary of the survey, so as to exclude it. The survey so corrected was approved, and advertised in accordance with the provisions of the Act of June 14, 1860; and no objection was made to the survey until the sixteenth day of June, 1869, when it was again advertised under the provisions of the Act of July 2, 1864; and objections were made by the owners of the grant, which were still pending, when the suit was brought. The defendant P. entered upon the land in controversy on the ninth day of January, 1860, and has since held the adverse possession. On January 10, 1868, a patent issued to one Henry P., as a pre-emptor, for a portion of the land, who conveyed the same to the defendant P.; to whom also, on May 2, 1870, a patent issued for the balance of the land. The action was commenced on the fifteenth day of April, 1868.

Held: 1. The case does not show that the claim to the ranch in question has been finally confirmed by the authorities of the United States. The order of the District Court dismissing the appeal was absolutely void, if the appeal to the Supreme Court was pending when the order was made, and the conclusive presumption is that the appeal is still pending, in the absence of a direct finding to the contrary; 2. The action having been commenced at a date less than five years after the passage of the Act of April 18, 1883, the plaintiff is not bound by the Statute of Limitations.

Opinion — McKinstry

McKinstry, J.: 1. The case does not show that the claim to the Eancho Arroyo del Eodeo has been finally confirmed by the authorities of the United States. The Court below found: “On the seventh day of March, 1856, the United States, by the regularly authorized District Attorney, gave regular notice of appeal, upon the part of the United States, from the decision and decree of said District Court to the Supreme Court of the United States. And said cause was regularly appealed by the United States from the said District Court to the Supreme Court of the United States. That thereafter and upon the -of-, 1857, at a subsequent term of said United States District Court, the said District Court of the United States made an order that said appeal was thereby dismissed, and the said claimants had leave to proceed as upon the final decree.”

The order of the District Court was absolutely void if the appeal to the Supreme Court was pending when the order was made, and the conclusive presumption is, that the appeal is still pending, in the absence of a direct finding to the contrary. (McGarrahan v. New Idria Co., 49 Cal. 381.) There is no finding that the appeal has ever been dismissed, or that any disposition has been made of it in the Supreme Court.

Mor can we resort to any presumption to help out the de[520]fective finding so as to make it sufficient to sustain the judgment. The order of the District Court does not recite or refer to any remittitur or mandate of the Supreme Court of the United States or pretend to assert that an order of dismissal had been made in the latter Court. No law of the United States has been called to our attention, or any practice in the Federal Courts, showing that such an order of the District Court followed, in the usual course, the dismissal of the appeal in the Supreme Court. The order does not purport to rest upon any previous action of the appellate tribunal, but implies, by its very terms, the exercise of an inherent and independent jurisdiction to put an end to the appeal and make final the judgment already entered. To hold that the order of the District Court conclusively proves that the appeal had been dismissed, is to overthrow the presumption arising from the fact that the appeal had been taken, and by means of a new presumption, to inject into the order a meaning entirely different from that which is expressed by its unambiguous language. Even if the order of the District Court can be treated as evidence tending to prove that the appeal had been dismissed, yet, as it does not conclusively establish the dismissal, the finding of the probative fact can not be substituted for a finding of the ultimate fact. (Coveny v. Hale, 49 Cal. 552.)

Younger v. Pagles

AI Brief

Synopsis

Opinion — McKinstry

More from California Supreme Court

Related research

Dissent — Myrick

AI Brief