Kidder v. Stevens

California Supreme Court Apr 29, 1882 No. No. 7,450Published

Before: McKinstry, Myrick, Sharpstein, Thornton

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Holding. The court held that the trial court's findings were sufficient to support the judgment, as the law presumes that a status once established, such as ownership conveyed by deed, continues until proven otherwise, and the specific date of seisin or ouster in an ejectment action is immaterial.

Issues

Whether the trial court's findings of fact were sufficient to support the judgment in an ejectment action.
Whether the presumption of the continuation of a status, such as ownership, is a rule of law that the court must apply.
Whether the specific date of seisin or ouster alleged in a complaint for ejectment is a material issue requiring a specific finding.

Disposition. affirmed

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“A status once established is presumed by the law to remain, until the contrary appears”

“The vice of the view taken by the learned counsel for appellant is this, that he takes that for an inference, or, as he calls it, “a presumption from evidence,” which is in fact a pure presumption of law.”

“It is stated in all the elementary books that time is immaterial as to seisin or ouster in the common law action of ejectment, and in all real actions.”

Synopsis

Ejectment—Pleading—Finding—Seisin—Ouster—Time.—In ejectment the complaint averred seisin in fee on the first day of June, 1879, and an ouster on the same day; and it was found by the Court that the plaintiff was owner in fee of the land in controversy, on the twenty-ninth of June, 1868, and conveyed the same to M. K. on the sixteenth of November, 1875; that M. K. died testate in May, 1879; that his executor leased to the defendant in August of the same year, and that defendant had continued to occupy the premises ever since. It was objected that there was no finding on the issue of ownership on the first day of June, 1879, the date of the seisin alleged in the complaint. Held: The findings cover all the material issues.

Id.—Id.—Id.—Id.—Id.—Id.—Presumption oe Law.—A presumption of law that is disputable when not changed by evidence becomes to the Court a rule indisputable for the case, and the Court is bound to apply it.

Id.—Id.—Id.—Id.—Id.—Id.—A status once established is presumed by the law to remain until the contrary appears.

Id.—Id.—Id.—Id.—Id.—Id.—Immaterial Allegation.—The allegation of time as to seisin or ouster in our so called action of ejectment, is not material, and a denial of it raises no material issue except when the mesne profits are in question.

Deed—Mental Incompetency.—The Court found that on the sixteenth day of November, 1875, and before and after that date, L. K. was of unsound mind—his mental unsoundness consisting of a fixed insane delusion in regard to religion, to wit: that he had incurred the displeasure of Cod, and could only expiate his sins by refraining from partaking of food; that he also during said time had occasional paroxysms of meloncholia; that on that day he signed, acknowledged and delivered to M. K. (his wife) a deed of gift of the premises in controversy; that said L. K. at the time he made and delivered the deed, understood the nature, force and effect of the act, and that said act was not the result of his insane delusion.

Held, that the finding was sustained by the evidence, and that the deed was valid.

Id.—Delivery—Conflict of Evidence.—The fact that the deed was found among the papers of the grantee after her death is some evidence at least that it had been delivered to and accepted by her; and evidence tending to prove non-delivery would simply raise a conflict in the testimony.

Id.—Admissibility of Evidence.—The Court did not err in admitting the evidence of Houghton (stated below). It tended to prove a motive for the making of the deed, and was admissible under the issues being tried.

Id.—Id.—No question concerning the will of M. K. was involved in this case, and it was not error to exclude evidence as to its existence or destruction.

Opinion — Thornton

Thornton, J.: The findings in this case are as follows: "1. On the twenty-ninth day of June, 1868, Barton B. Bee was the owner in fee of the premises described in the complaint, and on said day sold and conveyed the same to the plaintiff, L. Kidder; that said premises were the separate property of said B. Kidder.

“2. That on and prior to the sixteenth day of November, 1875, and from thence until the seventh day of May, 1879, said L. Kidder and Mary Kidder were husband and wife, and on the last-named date said Mary Kidder died testate.

“3. That prior to and on said sixteenth day of November, 1875, and for a long time thereafter said Llewellyn Kidder was of unsound mind; that his mental unsoundness consisted of a fixed insane delusion in regard to religion, to wit; That he had incurred the displeasure of God and that he could only expiate his sins by refraining from partaking of food. He also, during such time, had occasional paroxysms of melancholia.

“4. That on the sixteenth day of November, 1875, said Llewellyn Kidder signed, acknowledged, and delivered to said Mary Kidder a written deed of conveyance in proper form by way of gift to her of the said premises described in the complaint, and said Mary Kidder accepted said instrument.

“ 5. That said Llewellyn Kidder at the time he made and delivered said deed understood the nature, force and ef[418]fect of said act, and that said act was not the result of his said insane delusion.

“ 6. That said Mary Kidder was at the time of her death a resident of the county of Santa Clara, State of California. That in her last will she nominated and appointed Joseph C. Brown the executor thereof. That said will was proved in and admitted to probate by the Probate Court of said county of Santa Clara, on the nineteenth day of July, A. d. 1879, and letters testamentary were issued upon said will and the probate thereof by said Probate Court to said Brown, who duly qualified as such executor on the twenty-sixth day of July, 1879, and has been ever since the acting executor of said will.

“ 7. On the first day of August, 1879, said Brown as said executor demised and let said premises to the defendant Ira Stevens, who then entered into the possession and occupation thereof as the tenant of the estate of said Mary Kidder, deceased, and has ever since occupied the same.

Kidder v. Stevens

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Synopsis

Opinion — Thornton

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Concurrence — McKinstry

Concurrence — Myrick

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