Porter v. Woodward
Before: Thornton
Synopsis
Findings—Construction of Statute.—Under §635 of the Code of Civil Procedure as it originally stood, it was competent for the Court to disregard the findings prepared by the parties under a direction from the Court, and to prepare findings itself.
Id.— Ejectment — Possession — Van Hess Ordinance.—In an action of ejectment for lands within the operation of the Van Hess Ordinance, the Court found that neither the plaintiff nor any person under whom he claims title ever were in the possession of the lands. Held, that the finding was sufficient without going more particularly into the matters claimed to constitute possession. Query: whether such would be the case where the plaintiff requests findings on the particular points material to the issue of possession, and excepts to the refusal to find upon them.
Id.—Id.—Statute of Limitations.—In an action of ejectment, if the findings show that the plaintiff never had any title, a failure to find upon the defense of the Statute of Limitations is immaterial.
Ejectment—Evidence—Possession.—In an action of ejectment, where the title was possessory, the plaintiff offered in evidence a deed between third parties conveying a tract of land adjoining the land in suit, and stated that he proposed to show that the persons in occupation of the land so conveyed were in privity with the plaintiff, and that the improvements and occupancy there were made by tenants in common with the plaintiff. Held, that the deed was properly excluded.
Thornton, J.: This action was ejectment brought to recover a parcel of land situate within that portion of the city and county of San Francisco affected by the Van Ness Ordinance. Judgment passed for the defendants. The plaintiff moved for a new trial, which was denied, and he appealed from the order above mentioned.
The cause was tried by the Court, who made the following decision, by means of findings of fact and conclusion of law:
“1. That neither the plaintiff herein, nor his nor any or either of his ancestors, predecessors, or grantors, or of those under whom he claims, ever were in, or had or were entitled to, the possession of any part of the land described in his complaint, which is desci'ibed in the answers of the defendants against whom the action was tried, or of which said defendants were in possession when the action was commenced.
“ 2. That neither the plaintiff, nor any or either of his ancestors, predecessors, or grantors, or of those under whom he claims, ever had any estate, right, title, or interest in or to any part of the land described in said complaint, described in the separate answers of said defendants, or of which said defendants or either of them were in possession when this action was commenced.
“ 3. That, at the time this action was commenced, the said defendants were of right in possession of the parcels of land described in their respective answers; and that said defendants, their ancestors, predecessors, and grantors, and those under whom they claimed, had been in the actual, peaceable, open, notorious, and uninterrupted possession and occupation of said lands, holding and claiming to hold the same adversely to plaintiff, his ancestors, predecessors, and those under whom he claimed, and to all the world, for more than seventeen years next before the commencement of this action, having entered thereon under claim of title exclusive of any other right, found[537]ing such claim upon instruments in writing purporting to convey said land and the title thereto to them respectively.
■ “And as to the conclusion of .law from the facts found, I find that plaintiff should take nothing herein against said defendants, and that said defendants herein are entitled to have and receive of plaintiff their costs therein expended, and order judgment to be entered accordingly.”
It appears from the bill of exceptions that, on the 28th of August, 1874, the Coutt announced its decision, and directed the counsel for both parties to draw findings, that “ thereupon the plaintiff’s counsel prepared findings and presented them to the judge for his signature, and asked the judge to sign the same, and the counsel for the defendants also presented findings, and requested the judge to sign the same; and both were submitted to the judge on the 16th day of September, 1874, and taken under advisement. Afterwards, on the 8th day of January, 1875, the judge signed the findings which are on file, and refused to sign the findings, or any of them, requested by the plaintiff, to which signing and refusal to sign the plaintiff, by his counsel, then and there excepted.”
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