Moore v. Moore

Sharpstein, J.: The Court below sustained a demurrer to the plaintiff’s complaint on two grounds, viz.: That the alleged cause of action is barred by the Statute of Limitations, and that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

The action is for relief on the ground of fraud or mistake, and was commenced more than three years after the acts, upon which the plaintiff relies for relief, were committed. She alleges that she was induced to execute certain deeds of conveyance and a bill of sale without consideration, by undue influence or imposition, and that she “ did not know, understand, comprehend, learn, or discover the contents of said instruments, or the purpose, effect, or meaning thereof, of any of them, at any time prior to the -day of October, 1877,” which was within the three years next preceding the commencement of this action. The statute gave her three years from and after her discovery of the facts constituting the alleged fraud or mistake, within which to commence an action for redress. So long as she was ignorant of the contents of the instruments which she had been induced to execute, she was ignorant of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake upon which she relies for relief.

Under the rule that, “ in the construction of a pleading, for the purpose of determining its effect, its allegations must be liberally construed with a view to substantial justice, (Code Civ. [91]Proc. § 452) we think that this allegation should be held to be-substantially one that the plaintiff did not discover the facts constituting the fraud or mistake, of which she complains, until three years next preceding the commencement of this action.

The plaintiff’s cause of action, as stated in her complaint, is substantially as follows: On the 13th of July, 1871, she was married to one William II. Moore, with whom she lived and cohabited as his wife, until the 30th of October, 1871, when he was suddenly killed by being shot. At the time of his death she was pregnant with a child, to whom she gave birth within four months afterwards.

It is not alleged that insanity, or even temporary aberration of mind, resulted from the shock produced by her husband’s death; but that it caused great prostration of mind and body, and unfitted her for the transaction of business ; and that, on the second day after the burial of her deceased husband, and before she had recovered from the shock which his death had occasioned, she was waited upon by two brothers and two brothers-in-law of her late husband, who were accompanied by an attorney and notary. They presented to her and requested h er to sign the instruments which she now seeks to avoid. She was told by one of the brothers of her late husband, that it was his wish that she should sign them; and thereupon, without reading or knowing the contents of them, and without any negotiation as to the price to be paid, or any agreement or understanding in relation to any consideration for her doing so, she signed three instruments, by which she transferred to the surviving children of her late husband her entire interest in his estate. Previous to their marriage, he had made a will by which he gave all, or nearly all, of his property to those children. That will was revoked by his subsequent marriage.