Crowley v. Genesee Mining Co.

McKee, J.; On the trial of this ca sc in the Court below, it was admitted that one M. J. Quin was the president of the corporation, defendant in this case, and tho superintendent and managing agent of its mines in Plumas County, and had full control of its business in [274]that county, its principal place of business being in the city of San Francisco. It was proved that he was the princi]ial stockholder in the company. On the 11th of'’September, 1877, Quin employed the plaintiff to work in a quartz mine in Plumas County, belonging to the defendant, for the purpose of taking out what is known as “ tribute rock,” and delivering it at the defendant’s quartz mine, to be crushed by the company at its mill, free of cost or expenses to the plaintiff; and, as compensation for his services, one-half of, the gross amount of the proceeds of each crushing was to be paid to the plaintiff. On the 12th of September, 1877, the plaintiff went to work under this agreement of taking out rock from the mine, and continued to work for the defendant until January, 1878, when he was discharged by Quin.

Two crushings were made by the defendant, of rock taken out and delivered by the plaintiff: one on the 25th of October, 1877, and the other on the 7th of February, 1878. Of the proceeds of the first crushing, the plaintiff was paid according to the terms of the agreement. From the last crushing there was realized fifty and two-eighths ounces of gold dust, which was sent to the San Francisco mint for coinage ; and after paying all expenses and mint charges, there was due to the plaintiff over $400, which the defendant failed or refused to pay to the plaintiff ; and hence this suit.

It is objected by the corporation, that the agreement which was made with the plaintiff by its president, superintendent, and managing agent, is not a contract, but a lease. But the agreement is a contract of employment under § 1965, Civil Code; and it is binding on the defendant if Quin had authority to make it. Plaintiff does not rely on the existence of an authority of record; he did not claim, or prove, that the Board of Directors of the defendant had by resolution or order authorized Quin to make such a contract, or that the latter had ever informed the directors that he had made it. He himself claimed that Quin had authority from the admitted relations existing between him and the defendant.

Upon this theory the case was tried in the Court below ; and when the defendant offered to prove by Quin that the Board of Directors never authorized him to make such a contract with