People v. Kennedy

Thornton, J. : The defendant was indicted for burglary committed by entering a barn owned and occupied by one J. M. Blankenship, in the County of San Joaquin, with intent to commit larceny. The trial resulted in a conviction. The defendant moved for a new trial, which was denied. This appeal is prosecuted from the judgment of the Court, and the order denying a new trial.

It was admitted by the defendant that he entered the barn [202]above referred to, to sleep ; that when he got up in the morning, he saw the harness there, and stole it. All the evidence tended to show that he slept there during the night in question. The case turned on the intent with which the defendant entered the barn—whether or not he entered with intent to steal.

The Court distinctly told the jury that in order to find the defendant guilty, they must find that he entered the barn with intent to steal. The Court further instructed the jury that they must, in determining this question, take into consideration all the evidence before them. As this intent had to be deduced from circumstances, the jury were directed as to the mode in' which they were to consider circumstantial evidence, and as to the rules they must apply to such evidence, in deducing an intent therefrom. So far, there is no objection made to the directions given by the Court to the jury, and they are undoubtedly correct."

The Court further instructed the jury that every sane person is presumed to intend the consequences of his own acts, and that an unlawful act is done with an unlawful intent, and at the request of the defendant told the jury that “the mere entry into the barn or building of another is not in itself a crime.”

It is contended that as the Court had in effect told the jury that the entry into the barn was not unlawful, by stating to them that it was not criminal, and had further directed them that the law presumed that an unlawful act was .done with an unlawful intent; that inasmuch as the only unlawful act before the jury was that of stealing the harness, the direction of the Court was really that the law presumed from the unlawful act of stealing, the unlawful intent upon which they were to find, and that the jury might have inferred from this that the presumption of the law as stated by the Court was binding upon them, and that they were thus in effect told that upon this presumption they must find the intent to exist about which they were to inquire; that substantially the jury were told that they must find the entry with the intent to steal, from the fact of stealing. If this is a proper interpretation of the directions of the Court, it is error.