Fletcher v. Mower
Before: Sharpstehst
Synopsis
Patent —Vendob and Vendee—Contbact fob Bade of Land —Specific Pebfobmance—Vendob’s Lien—The Booth Bile.—In an action by a vend- or of land for a specific performance of tlio contract, and the enforcement of Ms lien: Held, that the decision of the cause must turn upon the question whether the plaintiff, when he tendered a conveyance of the land to the defendant, had a title thereto such as the parties contemplated at the time they entered into their contract; and held further—the question turning upon the validity of the jiatent discussed in the opinion, and under which the plaintiff deraigned title—that the patent was valid.
Sharpstehst, J.: In December, 1875, the plaintiff agreed in writing to convey to the defendant twenty acres of land for $1,000. Defendant paid $500 of the purchase price down, and executed a promissory note for the remaining $500, due eighteen months after its date. Whereupon the defendant took possession of the land.
After the note became due, the plaintiff brought suit on the note, tendered a deed according to agreement, and prayed for judgment against the defendant for the amount due on the note, and that the land be sold, and the proceeds applied in satisfaction of such judgment, etc. Prayer in usual form.
Defendant, by his answer, admits all these facts, but denies that the plaintiff had, at the time of the execution of the agreement, or has now, the legal title to the lands, and alleges that there is an entire failure of consideration for the agreement of defendant and the $500 paid ; alleges that the land was public land, subject to the general land laws of the United States, and [121]that the defendant, being a qualified pre-emptor, entered and settled upon the S. i of the NW. í and 1ST. i of SW. of sec. 32, T. 2 S.,E. 13 W., S. B. M., which includes the land in controversy, on the 12th day of March, 1876, claiming the same under the pre-emption laws of the United States; alleges the qualification of defendant as a pre-emptor, that he has tendered his filing, proof, and payment in the United States Land Office, etc.
Defendant also alleges that the land in controversy was, until 1871, within°the claimed and exterior limits, of a valid Mexican grant, and was not subject to selection by the State; that the title of plaintiff is by a patent from the State of California, which patent is alleged to be void.
Defendant also states that he tendered plaintiff the possession of the land, and offered to account for the rents and profits, and demanded a rescission of the contract; and upon these facts, defendant prays that the title of plaintiff be adjudged void, and that plaintiff be enjoined from asserting any title to the land; that the agreement between plaintiff and defendant be rescinded, and that defendant recover judgment for the money paid plaintiff, etc.
Trial was had; judgment rendered for defendant as prayed for; motion for a new trial was made and denied, and this appeal taken from the order denying the motion and from the judgment.
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