Alexander v. Bouton
Before: McKee
Synopsis
Married Women — Contract — Promissory Note — Mortgage—Principad and Sureties.—The appellant, to secure the debt of her husband, joined with him in a note, and in a mortgage upon her separate property—having been induced to do so by the representations of her husband that she was to be liable only to the extent of the mortgaged property. The plaintiff also took a collateral agreement from others, to secure any deficiency lliat might remain after the sale of the mortgaged property; but the defendants were not parties to tills agreement. Held—in an action to foreclose tlie mortgage, that the appellant was bound as principal, and that her liability was not affected by tlio understanding she had with her husband, or by the additional security taken by the plaintiff; and held further, that she was liable for any deficiency that might arise upon the sale of tho mortgaged premises, and that judgment might he docketed against her for it.
Id.—Id.—Id.—Id.—A' married woman, except in relation to her separate property, is, in this State, under a disability to contract; but, as to her separate property, she is considered as a femme sole, and may make any contract with relation to it; and where a married woman executes a note, and a mortgage upon her separate property, the promise to pay is to he construed as relating, not only to the mortgaged premises, but to her separate property generally.
McKee, J.: Defendants in the Court below, on the 1st of September, 1877, made the promissory note and executed the mortgage which constitute the subject-matter in controversy in this case. [17]The defendant, E. Bouton, since the execution of the note and mortgage, has been adjudicated a bankrupt. As a defense to the action, the defendant, Margaret, in her answer to the complaint, alleges that, at the time of the execution of the mortgage, she was a married woman and the wife of the codefendant; that her husband was at that time in debt; and for the purpose of enabling him to borrow money from the plaintiff to pay his indebtedness, she became security for him to the extent of her separate property; that of the money which her husband received from the plaintiff she had had no portion; but that her husband received and applied it all to the payment of 1ns debt. No portion of it was applied to her use and benefit, or to the use and benefit of any of her separate property; that the plaintiff knew that she signed the promissory note oidy as a surety, and with knowledge of that fact had taken an agreement in writing from others to pay any deficiency in case the mortgaged premises should, after foreclosure and sale, prove insufficient to satisfy the mortgage debt; and that, in consideration thereof, the plaintiff agreed to release her from any judgment for insufficiency.
At the trial the promissory note and mortgage were offered in evidence. The one was signed by the husband and wife, and the other was also executed by them in the mode prescribed by law. By the promissory note both, jointly and severally, promised to pay to the plaintiff, or to her order, the sum of $2,000, one year after date, with interest at the rate of one percent, per month, etc. By the mortgage both also jointly and severally covenanted to pay to the plaintiff the promissory note when it became due, and all assessments and liens which might be laid or imposed upon the mortgaged property during the existence of the mortgage.
It does not appear by the promissory note or mortgage that the mortgaged premises were the separate property of the wife; but, at the trial of the case, the wife testified that they were her separate property; and the husband in substance testified that he and a friend, by representations or statements made to the wife, induced her to consent to mortgage her property, for the purpose of enabling him to borrow the money from the plaintiff, and that she signed the promissory note and executed the mort[18]
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