Thompson v. Felton
Before: Department, Sharpstein, Thornton
Synopsis
Adverse Possession—Statute of Limitations—Law of the Case—Notice— Definitions.—T. being in adverse possession of land, and having the same inclosed, leased it to O. Afterward the land was patented as part of a Mexican grant; and O. (without the knowledge of T.) attorned to M., the grantor of the defendants, and the owner of the land under the patent; M. having no knowledge of O.’s being in possession as tenant for T., and being informed by O., upon inquiry, that he was in possession for himself. Subsequently, and more than five years after the issue of the patent, O. surrendered possession to T., who was shortly afterward ejected by the defendants. In an action to recover the possession by T. (claiming to have acquired the title by an adverse possession for over five years subsequent to the patent): Held—following the decision of this Court upon a former appeal of this case—as follows:
1st. To constitute an adverse possession, the occupation must be open, visible, notorious, and exclusive, and must be retained under a claim of right to hold the land against the owner: and the owner must have knowledge, or the means of knowledge of such occupation and claim of right.
2nd. The possession of 0. was sufficient to put all persons upon inquiry as to the capacity in which he held; but M. having made the inquiry without success, was not affected with notice of his relationship to T.
3rd. Therefore, after the attornment of O. to T. (the latter having no notice, either actual or constructive, that the former held otherwise than for himself) the possession of T., through O. his tenant, was not.adverse, in a legal sense, to the title of M. and his successors.
Ib.—Id.—Definition.—To constitute adverse possession, there must be, not only an actual occupation, but also a claim of title hostile to that of the true owner. Held, accordingly, that it was error to instruct the jury to the effect that land was adversely possessed where protected by a substantial inclosure, or where it has been usually cultivated or improved; the definition, omitting the element of hostility, which is an indispensable constituent of adverse possession.
Ib.—Landlord and Tenant—Attornment—Law of the Case.—Thornton, J., concurring: The patent was issued in pursuance of the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction, and O., in yielding to it, attorned in consequence of this judgment, which brought the case within the section of the Act of 1855, referred to in the former decision of this case (44 Cal. 508). But this Court,’ in that decision, on the same facts, held the attornment to be void, and this has become the law of the case.
Opinion — Departmentsharpstein
Department No. 2, Sharpstein, J.: The plaintiff sues in ejectment for the recovery of about forty acres of land lying within a larger tract known as the Bernal Bancho. The entire tract was granted to the Bernals, by the [551]Mexican Government, and on the 31st day of December, 1857, the United States issued a patent to them for it. The defendant deraigns title through mesne conveyances from the Bernals. The plaintiff claims to have acquired title to the tract involved in this action, by an adverse possession thereof for a period of five years prior to the ouster. A verdict was rendered in favor of the plaintiff. The defendant moved for a new trial, which was granted; and from that order the plaintiff has appealed.
To establish an adverse possession for the statutory period, the plaintiff testified that in 1853-4 he inclosed a tract of about 118 acres, which included the land sued for in this action, and from that time until the latter part of 1855 he pastured stock within the inclosure. In November, 1855, he leased the premises to one Osborn, and went into the interior of the State, where he remained until 1863. In the meantime a patent for the ¡Rancho issued, and Osborn took a lease of the land in 1859 from J. Mora Moss, who at that time held the legal title to it under the patent. When the plaintiff returned to San Francisco in 1863, Osborn claimed to be in possession of about onetliird of the tract leased to him by plaintiff. Osborn delivered, and plaintiff assumed possession of, all that Osborn had retained possession of up to that date.
Osborn never lived upon any part of the land leased to him by plaintiff, but testifies that he used it for pasturage, and kept the fences in sufficient repair for that purpose. The case has been here before under the title of Thompson v. Pioche, (44 Cal. 505) and the questions then decided must be treated as finally settled so far as this case is concerned. One of the points decided was, that, if Moss had no knowledge, and after reasonable inquiry had failed to obtain any, of the relation which-existed between the plaintiff and Osborn at the time when the latter took a lease from Moss, the effect of the acceptance of said lease by Osborn from Moss was to interrupt the running of the Statute of Limitations, so that thereafter the possession of the plaintiff through his tenant Osborn was not adverse, in a legal sense, to the title of Moss and those claiming under him. And the Court further said: “We are of the opinion that the evidence failed to bring home to Moss notice of the plaintiff’s
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