Grimm v. O'Connell

Department No. 1, McKinstry, J.: 1st. The assessment for the fiscal year 1872-3 was void. (Houghton v. Austin, 47 Cal. 646; Wills v. Austin, 53 Id. 179; Harper v. Rowe, Id. 233.)

2nd. The Court below found that the demanded premises were assessed for taxes for the years 1874-5 and 1875-6 to one Charles Grimm; further, that “ the Tax Collector’s deeds upon [523]those assessments, (which afterward became delinquent, etc.) recited that the said land had been assessed to said Charles Grimm, and all owners or claimants known or unknown,” etc. If the assessments were as recited in the deeds, they were legally void. (Grotenfend v. Ultz, 53 Cal. 666; 13 Cal. 609: 30 Id. 537; 32 Id. 328.)

Sections 3776 and 3777 of the Political Code require of the Collector to execute and deliver to the purchaser a certificate stating, amongst other things, “ when known, the name of the person assessed.” Section 3786 declares : “ The matters recited in the certificate of sale must he recited in the (Collector’s) deed.”

Where the statute prescribes the particular form of the tax-deed, the form becomes substance, and must be strictly pursued, or the deed will be held void. (Blackwell on Tax Titles, p. 366.) If the officer fails to make a deed which complies with the law, it would seem that he can be compelled by mandamus to-execute a proper deed. (Hewell v. Lane, 53 Cal. 213.) Where the statute form required a recital of the year for which the taxes were due, a deed in which the year was misrecited was said to be void. (Maxcy v. Clabaugh, 1 Gilm. 26.) It is certainly competent for the Legislature to prescribe the form of the instrument which—as the result of a proceeding in invitum—can alone divest the citizen of his title. And when a form has been made necessary, it is not for the Courts to inquire whether the required recitals are of material facts or otherwise. It was said by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts—speaking of certain arbitrary rules established • by the Legislature with reference to the settlement of paupers—“ The Legislature has seen fit, among other things, to establish as the criterion of a settlement, not the holding of an estate of a particular kind, * * * but the introduction of the estate into the valuation of the assessors,” etc. (apparently not the important circumstance). "These several requisites are indispensable.” (Monson v. Chester, 22 Pick. 300.) A special power, granted by statute, affect-ins: the rights of individuals, and which divests the title to real estate, ought to be strictly pursued, and it should so appear on the face of the proceedings. Every requisite having the sem