Bateman v. Superior Court (1880) · DecisionDepot

Bateman v. Superior Court

Name: California Superior Court Tentative Rulings
Creator: DecisionDepot
License: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/

California Supreme Court Jul 1, 1880 No. No. 6,917Published

Before: Department, McKinstry

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Holding. The court held that the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction by appointing a receiver in an action at law for the recovery of real property, as such an appointment is not authorized by the Code of Civil Procedure or the usages of equity.

Issues

Whether the District Court had the authority to appoint a receiver in an action of ejectment pending before it.

Disposition. Order annulled.

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“We are of opinion that in making the order appointing a Receiver, the District Court exceeded its jurisdiction, and that the order should be annulled.”

Synopsis

Receiver—Jurisdiction—Certiorari.—Under the Code of Civil Procedure, the District Court had no jurisdiction to appoint a Receiver in an action of ejectment; and an order making such appointment should be annulled.

Id.— Id.— Id.— Constitutional Law. — Subdivision 6, of § 561 of the Code of Civil Procedure is but declaratory of the equity jurisdiction conferred upon the District Courts by the former Constitution, in giving them jurisdiction of “all cases in equity,” and includes only the suits iu which it has been the usage of Courts of Equity to appoint a receiver: their jurisdiction in this respect would have been the same in the absence of the statutory provision.

Department No. 1, McKinstry, P. J.: An action, in the form which has in this State been usually styled “ ejectment,” was brought in the late District Court of the Twenty-third Judicial District by the “ Savings and Loan Society,” a corporation, against the present petitioner and others. Plaintiff therein alleged that it was, and at all times since a certain date, had been, the owner, seized in fee, and entitled to the immediate and exclusive possession of the demanded premises, and that the defendants therein had been in possession of the same from a date included in the period of the alleged ownership of the plaintiff, and since such date had wrongfully and unlawfully withheld, etc.; further, that the rents, issues, and profits of the demanded premises, while plaintiff had been wrongfully excluded therefrom, was the sum of $250 for each and every month. The prayer was for the recovery of the possession of the real property, for the sum of $5,000 “ dam[286]ages for the withholding thereof,” and for the value of the “ rents, issues, and profits,” and costs.

The answer in the action of ejectment was a general and specific denial of all the averments of the complaint, and an allegation that the defendant, Bateman, was the owner. This last addedno force to the denial of plaintiff’s right.

After the issues were made up in the District Court, (the action has not yet been tried) that Court made an order, of which the following is the material portion:

“ (Title of the Action.)

“ On reading the pleadings in said cause, and on filing the affidavit of Cyrus W. Carmany, the cashier of the plaintiff, * * * and on motion of A. N. Drown, attorney for plaintiff, the said plaintiff having made and filed a bond, * * * it is ordered, that the defendant, M. C. Bateman, show cause before the Judge of this Court at his chambers * * * why a Receiver should not be appointed to take the charge, management, and, control of the real property described in the plaintiff’s complaint, and the proceeds thereof, during the pendency of said action, with power to lease said real property, collect the rents thereof, and apply the same, as far as shall be necessary, to the payment of taxes, assessments, insurance, and charges on said real property, and to protect the same against loss and waste,” etc.

On the return day mentioned in the foregoing order to show cause, the District Court, after hearing the parties, appointed Terence Landry “Receiver,” with powers and duties set forth in the order.

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We think the sixth subdivision of § 564 of the Code of Civil Procedure was but declaratory of the equity jurisdiction conferred upon the District Courts by the former Constitution, and was intended to include all cases not previously enumerated, in which a Court of Equity would have appointed a Receiver. If the sixth subdivision had been omitted from the section, the District Courts would have had power to appoint Receivers in “ cases where receivers had theretofore been appointed by the usages of the courts of equity because by art. 6, § 6, of the late Constitution, the District Court had jurisdiction in “ all cases in equity.” This power was recognized in La Societé Francaise v. The District Court, 53 Cal. 495. Throughout the opinion in that case, it is assumed that the sixth subdivision of § 564 of the Code was intended to include only the suits in which. [289](upon the pleadings, or upon appropriate showing by affidavit or other proofs) it had been the usage of Courts of Equity to appoint a Receiver. If it had been intended to confer the power to appoint an officer of that character in an action at law for the recovery of the possession of real property, it is not credible that the Legislature would not have said so in terms, since it is apparent that it was their purpose to specify all cases, whether at law or equity, in which Receivers could be appointed. The five subdivisions containing such specifications are followed by the sixth, which provides for the appointment where “ receivers have heretofore been appointed by the usages of courts of equity,” which expression we conceive to be the equivalent of that employed in the third subdivision of the 143rd section of the former Practice Act—“ such cases as are in accordance with the practice of courts of equity jurisdiction.” Either of these expressions simply means, that in addition to the particular instances mentioned in the preceding subdivisions, the appointment should be made by the District Court, as a Court of Equity, in the other suits in which the power would have been employed had there been no statute on the subject, and cannot be construed as authorizing the appointment in an action at law.

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