Tulley v. Tranor

California Supreme Court Jul 1, 1878 No. No. 5040Published

Before: McKinstry

AI Brief

AI-generated · verify before citing

Holding. The court held that the amendment to Civil Code section 3336, which removed the option to recover the highest market value of converted property, applies retrospectively to cases involving prior conversions because the rule of damages is an arbitrary statutory provision rather than a vested right. Consequently, the trial court erred by admitting evidence of the property's value at dates subsequent to the conversion.

Issues

Whether the amendment to Civil Code section 3336 applies to conversions occurring before its passage.
Whether the statutory rule of damages for conversion constitutes a vested right that cannot be altered by retrospective legislation.
Whether a plaintiff can demand judgment on appeal based on admissions in the pleadings that were not asserted during the trial.

Disposition. reversed and remanded

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“The general language covers all cases of wrongful conversion.”

“No case has been referred to in which it has been held that to change an arbitrary and statutory rule of damages in cases of tort was a deprivation of any vested right”

“For the error in admitting evidence of the value of the property at dates subsequent to its conversion, the judgment and order is reversed, and cause remanded for a new trial.”

Synopsis

Conversion—Retroactive Amendment to Civil Code.—The amendment of sec. 3336 of the Civil Code, which took effect July 1st, 1874, operated upon the trial of an action brought for the conversion of personal property which took place after the amendment took effect, although the conversion had occurred prior to the amendment.

Same—Construction oe Statute.—The expression of see. 3336, “the detriment caused by the wrongful conversion of personal property is presumed to be,” indicates that it was intended to establish a legal presumption to operate, and which could only operate, at the trial of the cause.

Same—“Right Acquired.” — The right to resort, at the trial of an action for the conversion of personal property, to an arbitrary presumption, of detriment was not, previous to the trial at which the presumption would have arisen, a “right acquired” within the meaning of sec. 286 of the Amendments to the Civil Code, which took effect July 1st, 1874.

“ Proceeding Taken.”—The commencement of an action before the “Amendments” took effect was not a “proceeding taken” within the meaning of the section aforesaid.

Practice on Appeal.—When a cause has been tried by the parties in the Court below on the theory that an averment in the complaint is denied by the answer, the plaintiff will not be x>ermitted in this Court to claim that the averment is not denied.

By the Court, McKinstry, J.: When this action was commenced, sec. 3336 of the Civil Code read: “ The detriment caused by the wrongful conversion of personal property is presumed to be, (1) the value of the property at the time of the conversion, with the interest from that time, or, where the action has been prosecuted with reasonable diligence, the highest market value of the property at any time between the conversion and the verdict, without interest, at the option- of the injured party; and (2) a fair compensation for the time and money properly expended in pursuit of the property.”

Prior to the, trial of the cause in the District Court, the section was amended by striking out therefrom the words : “ Or, where the action was prosecuted with reasonable diligence, the highest market value of the property at any time between the conversion and the verdict, without interest, at the option of the injured party.” There can be no reasonable doubt that the amendment was intended to be applicable to a case in which the conversion had occurred prior to its passage. The general language covers all cases of wrongful conversion. The expres[279]sion “ is presumed to be ” indicates that it was intended to establish a legal presumption to operate, and which could only operate, at the trial of the cause; and sec. 286 of the amendatory act, (Amendments to the Codes of 1873-4, 268} repeals all provisions of law inconsistent with the act. It is true the same section provides: “No rights acquired or proceedings taken under the provisions repealed shall be impaired or in any manner affected by this repeal.” But this only renders it the more apparent that, except as to rights acquired or proceedings taken under the repealed law, the amendments were intended to operate retrospectively, so as to include all cases of previous conversions. 0

Sec. 286 of the amendatory act applies to all the provisions of the act which may affect “ rights acquired or proceedings taken.” The “ proceeding ” referred to was a proceeding under the statute amended8, whereby some right had been acquired, and which could not be disregarded without affecting the right itself. No such proceeding could be affected by the amendment to the section under consideration. The right of the party to appeal to the rule as to damages did not depend upon the fact that he had commenced his action when the amendments took effect. The expression “ proceedings taken ” is not the equivalent of “ suit commenced ”; for if plaintiff had not a vested right to damages according to a certain standard before the action was brought, the mere commencement of the action did not create a new and vested right.

Tulley v. Tranor

AI Brief

Synopsis

More from California Supreme Court

Related research

AI Brief