Stone v. Geyser Quicksilver Mining Co.

California Supreme Court Jul 1, 1877 No. No. 5532Published

Before: Cotjet

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Holding. The court held that the jury instructions were erroneous because they improperly allowed the jury to consider the defendants' subjective beliefs, suggested that an intention to return must be in good faith, and improperly directed the jury on presumptions of fact.

Issues

Whether jury instructions regarding abandonment were erroneous in allowing consideration of the defendant's belief of abandonment.
Whether the court erred in instructing the jury that certain facts raised a presumption of abandonment.
Whether the court erred in requiring that an intention to return to a mine must be in good faith.

Disposition. reversed and remanded

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“The jury were informed that they were at liberty to rest a finding of abandonment—in part, at least—upon the circumstance, if proved, that defendant “ reasonably believed ” the mining ground to have been abandoned.”

“It is erroneous for the Court to charge that the existence of facts developed in the evidence “raises a reasonable presumption ” of the existence of another fact.”

“The question of abandonment can never arise except where there has been possession, and then the animus revertendi is the simple test.”

Synopsis

Abandonment of Mine. — In the trial of an issue as to whether mining ground had been abandoned by the plaintiff before the defendant’s entry, the fact that the defendant believed the mine had been abandoned by the plaintiff when he entered is not to be taken into consideration by the jury in determining the issue.

Idem. — The question of abandonment can never arise except' where there has been possession, and then the question is simply whether the possessor intended to return, and whether he intended to return in good faith or bad faith.

Idem.—It is erroneous for the Court to instruct the jury that they are authorized to find the fact of abandonment from the existence of other facts.

Right of Juror to Pass on Facts.—It is erroneous for the Court to instruct the jury that they are authorized to find a fact from the existence of other facts. This is different from telling the jury that the existence of a fact tends to4>rove another fact.

Defendants’ instruction directed the jury to consider all the plaintiff’s acts indicating an absence of intention to preserve his rights. It should have authorized the jury to consider, along with other things, all acts showing an intention not to preserve his rights. It shifts the onus.

It is a negative pregnant. It gives the jury the Court’s permission to look only at acts making against the plaintiff, and to ignore everything in his favor.

It also authorized an inquiry on the part of the jury that was altogether officious. It told them the evidence should not only affirmatively show the animus revertendi, but it must go farther and show that the plaintiff was going to return to work the mine. As a matter of course, no such proof of the object of return was necessary. When a miner returns to his mine, all inquiry as to abandonment ends; if he does not work it, the default is another matter, and to be treated according to the rules concerning work.

The instruction is, also, in substance, that every seeming abandonment is real.

The question of abandonment never even arises until there is an appearance of abandonment, and, according to the instruction, whenever it arises, it is to be determined conclusively against the party who goes off the ground, by force of the circumstances that raised it.

[317]The question of abandonment was properly left to the jury. (Davis v. Parley, 30 Cal. 636; Stoolcoe v. Singers, 8 El. & B. 31; Crossly v. Lightowler, L. R. 3 Eq. 291; Puentes v. United States, 22 How. 460 ; GlucJcaufv. Peed, 22 Cal. 468.)

These cases show that when the possession is relinquished, the animus revertendi must be openly manifested, and must be an intention, not merely to hold on to a claim of right, but in good faith and within a reasonable time to resume possession and beneficial enjoyment—and so are - all the analogies. (Snediclcer v. Waring, 2 Kern. 170; Wadleigh v. Janovin, 41 N. H. 512; Pate v. DlacJchurn, 48 Miss. 1; Taylor, L. & T. sec. 552; Pilis v. Page, 1 Pick. 48; Davis v. Petty, 14 Iowa, 528.)

It was enough if the plaintiff so conducted as to create such an appearance of abandonment that others, acting in the reasonable belief that there was an abandonment, altered their position; at least, from such acts the jury are authorized to infer abandonment. (Angelí on Highways; 1 Man. & G.; 8 El. & B.; E. R. 3 Eq. and other cases.)

Stone v. Geyser Quicksilver Mining Co.

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