McCreery v. Sawyer

California Supreme Court Jul 1, 1877 No. No. 5136Published

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Holding. The court held that a defendant without a valid claim to the title cannot challenge the validity of a city deed, and that the defendant's offer of proof regarding possession was insufficient to establish a claim under the Act of March 8, 1866.

Issues

Whether a defendant without a claim to title may challenge the validity of a city deed.
Whether the defendant's offer of proof regarding possession was sufficient to establish a claim under the Act of March 8, 1866.
Whether the defendant's answer sufficiently pleaded the Statute of Limitations.

Disposition. affirmed

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“A party not showing himself entitled to a deed from the city and county cannot question the right of a party receiving such deed.”

“The conveyance running to the plaintiff from the City and County of San Francisco was properly admitted in evidence.”

“It is obvious that this defense, as thus pleaded, is not a plea of the Statute of Limitations.”

Synopsis

Conveyance by Tbustee to Beneficiaby. — If a city holds the title to lands within its limits as a trustee for the parties in possession of the same, and to be conveyed to such parties upon the compliance by them with certain conditions, and the proper authorities of the city convey the land, one who has no claim to the land cannot raise the question whether the grantee was a beneficiary, and entitled as such to the conveyance.

Idem:—Sucli deed is conclusive as evidence in favor of the grantee, in ejectment by the grantee, against one who has no claim to the title of the city.

Plea of the Statute of Limitations.—An answer in ejectment stating that the defendant was, when the suit was commenced, is now, and has been, for more than five years immediately prior thereto, tlio owner of and seized in fee, and entitled to tlio possession of the demanded premises, is not a plea of the Statute of Limitations.

Pueblo Lands of San Fbancisco.—One who claims title to Pueblo lands in San Francisco as a beneficiary under the Act of Congress of March 8th, lSGti, and of Order No. 800, must show that his possession on the 8th oí March, 1866, was bona fide.

The recitals in the deed were not sufficient evidence of the truth of the same, and these recitals should have been proved.

The City of San Francisco was a trustee, and its deed, as such, must show the procuration on its face and be accompanied by proof of strict observance of all pre-requisites.

Wilson & Wilson, for Despondent.

A party not showing himself entitled to a deed from the city and county cannot question the right of a party receiving such deed. The deed itself is sufficient evidence as against the city or a stranger. (Leroy v. Cunningham, 44 Cal. 600; Low v. Lewis, 46 Ibid. 549; Van Hastrup v. Madison City, 1 Wall. 297; Dupond v. Barstow, 45 Cal. 451; Doll v. Meador, 16 Ibid. 325; Randall v. Austin, 46 Ibid. 269; Wetherbee v. Dunn, 32 Ibid. 108; Flint v. Clinton, 12 N. H. 430; Dillon on Cor. 435-6.)

By the Court : 1. The conveyance running to the plaintiff from the City and County of San Francisco was properly admitted in evidence.

When it was offered, and admitted, the defendant did not appear to have any claim to the title conferred on the city by the Act of March 8th, 1866, and conveyed to the plaintiff by the deed in question, and it was, therefore, no concern of his whether the plaintiff had been rightfully determined to be a beneficiary under the Act of 1866 or not. “ That was a question ” (as was said here in Le Roy v. Cunningham) “ for the Board of Supervisors, in which the defendant had no concern, inasmuch as he was not entitled to the conveyance.” (44 Cal. 609.)

2. The motion for nonsuit, as made in the Court below, when the plaintiff rested, was but a repetition in another form of the objections made to the conveyance—“ that the plaintiff had not proved title or right of possession to the demanded premises.” The motion assumed that the conveyance made by the city to the plaintiff was inoperative, because it had not been shown by evidence dehors the deed and its recitals, that the plaintiff was a beneficiary under the act, and it also assumed that the defendant was in a position to litigate that question.

The views we have expressed under the first point arc decisive against the appellant upon this point.

3. It is next claimed by the appellant in his printed points, that he offered to show that “ he. was in the actual, bona fide possession of the demanded premises on the 8th of March, 1866, and claimed a right under the Act of Congress of that date.”

The bill of exceptions, as found in the record, however, docs not support the claim of the appellant in this respect. Its language upon this point is as follows: “ In defense, defendants offered to prove that they had been in the actual, exclusive, and adverse possession of the demanded premises for five years and upwards, next before the filing of the complaint herein.”

McCreery v. Sawyer

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