Brown v. Lawson
Before: McKinstry
Synopsis
Service of Summons on Minor.—Under the Practice Act of 1851, in an action against an infant, if he was over fourteen years of age the summons was served by delivering to him personally a copy of the same, and a certified copy of the complaint.
Idem.—If a father sues his infant son residing with him, and the statute requires the summons to be served personally on the infant and .also on the father, a service on the infant alone is sufficient, for the father has notice of the suit without service.
Idem.—If a judgment against an infant is offered in evidence, and the record shows service on the infant, but does not show with whom he was residing, it will be presumed for the purpose of sustaining the jurisdiction that he was residing with his father.
Return of Service of Summons.—In a collateral attack on a judgment, the return of a sheriff that he served a copy of the summons, will be held equivalent to a return that he served a copy certified by the clerk.
By the Court,. McKinstry, J.: The decree entered at the June term, 1854, is valid. As the law then stood, the service of the summons on the de[617]fendants of the age of fourteen years, and upwards, was sufficient. (Practice Act of 1851, Sec. 29, subd. 1; Freeman on Judgments, Sec. 151.)
The infant less than fourteen (Alexander Martin) will be presumed to have been residing with, and to have been under the charge of, his parents, as there is nothing in the record to suggest the contrary. No service could properly have been made, therefore, on any other person than on the ■infant himself, and on his father and mother. (Practice Act of 1851, Sec. 29.)
But the father and mother were plaintiffs in the action. The maxim lex non cogit ad vana will have influence in applying the rules of statutory construction, and, unless the letter of the law absolutely requires it, the Legislature will not be held to have made the performance of any act a prerequisite to the acquisition of jurisdiction which could afford no protection to the infant, or information to the natural guardian.
It is manifest that service on the father, who was plaintiff, could in no way have benefited the infant, and we are convinced that the provision requiring such service does not apply where the father is plaintiff. The purpose of the statute was that the natural guardian of the minor should have notice of the proceeding against him, and it cannot be assumed it was intended that the plaintiff should notify himself of the commencement of his own suit.
The sheriff returned that he had served a copy of the complaint. It is urged that the judgment is void, because the return does not show that he served a copy “certified’’ by the clerk. No greater effect should be given to this omission, because the defendant was an infant, than if he were an adult. The statute, in every case, directs that a copy certified by the clerk shall be served on the defendant; the additional requisite in case of an infant under fourteen being that a copy shall also be served on the guardian. But whether there is a fatal defect in the service of summons on those required to be served is, in every case, to be tested in the same manner.
It has been held that a return that the defendant was [618]
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