Frisbie v. Moore

By the Court: It appears from the agreed statement of facts that in the year 1861, the plaintiff, being a purchaser from Vallejo (the grantee of the Mexican Government), of a parcel of land included in the Suscol rancho, sold it to the female defendant, then an unmarried woman, and conveyed it to her by a deed containing no covenant of warranty; that a portion of the purchase money was paid at the date of the deed, and the vendee then executed to the plaintiff her obligation in writing, whereby she undertook to pay him the further sum of $1,000 with interest, “ on the final confirmation by the constituted authorities of the Government of the United States of America, of the rancho of Suscol, in the State of California;” and at the same time executed a mortgage to the plaintiff on the premises conveyed, to secure the performance of the obligation. The action is to enforce payment of the $1,000, with interest, and for a foreclosure of the mortgage. It further appears that, at the date of the conveyance and of the obligation and mortgage, the claim of Vallejo for a confirmation of his title to the Suscol rancho was pending and undecided in the Supreme Court of the United States; but was subsequently finally rejected and pronounced invalid by that court. It also appears that on obtaining the conveyance from the plaintiff, the vendee entered into and has ever since remained in possession of the premises conveyed; and that on the passage of the Act of Congress of March 9, 1863, granting to purchasers from Vallejo the right to pre-empt the land so purchased, she instituted proceedings under that act to obtain the title of the United States, and ultimately succeeded in obtaining a patent for the land under that act, but in accomplishing this result was forced to expend a considerable sum of money. The court below, after crediting her with the sum so expended, entered a judgment against her for the remainder [519]of the $1,000 and interest, and directed a foreclosure of the mortgage for the balance so ascertained, and from this judgment the defendants appealed. The plaintiff contends that the case is not distinguishable in principle from Snow v. Ferrea (45 Cal., 195). But in that case the contract was entered into after the title to the Suscol rancho had been finally rejected, and the undertaking of the vendee was that “ on demand after Henry Hannibal (the vendor) shall obtain the title of the United States of America, and execute to me a good and valid warranty deed against all parties, the United States of America included, in and to what is known as the Brownlee field upon the Suscol rancho,” the vendee would pay to the vendor a specified sum.