Spect v. Gregg

California Supreme Court Jul 1, 1875 No. No. 4377Published

AI Brief

AI-generated · verify before citing

Holding. The court affirmed the judgment, holding that the defendant failed to provide the necessary specifications of insufficiency of evidence to challenge the jury's finding that the disputed land fell outside the defendant's deeds. Additionally, the court ruled that the power of attorney was properly acknowledged and that the agent's conveyance was valid.

Issues

Whether the admission of the Spanish deed was prejudicial error.
Whether the power of attorney was properly acknowledged and executed.
Whether the agent's conveyance exceeded the scope of his authority.
Whether the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's finding regarding the land description.

Disposition. affirmed

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“If, therefore, the court below erred in admitting the record, it was an error "which could not have injured the defendant.”

“The acknowledgment substantially complied with-the statute.”

“The record contains no specification of an insufficiency of evidence to uphold a finding that the lands in controversy were without the calls of defendant’s deeds.”

Synopsis

Claiming under a Common Source of Title.—If, in an action of ejectment, both parties claim to derive title from the same source, it is not necessary for the plaintiff to introduce in evidence a conveyance from a former owner to the person having this source of title; and if error is committed in receiving such conveyance in evidence, it does no harm.

Descbiftion in a Deed.—A deed of an undivided two-thirds of two leagues of land, part of a Spanish grant of eleven leagues, which describes the two leagues as including the town of Colusa, contains a sufficient description to authorize it to be received in evidence in an action to recover lots in Colusa.

Certified Copt of Paper as Evidence.—A certified copy from the recorder’s office of a power of attorney purporting to have been executed by four persons, but acknowledged by one only, is admissible in evidence.

Deed as Evidence.—A deed executed by several persons, by their attorney in fact, is admissible in evidence, if the .power was executed by one of the grantors.

Deed with Condition Subsequent.—A deed on condition subsequent passes the title to the grantee.

Construction of Power of Attorney.—If a power of attorney authorizes the attorney in fact to sell and convey lots in a town “for purposes of actual improvement for mercantile and other purposes,” the agent is authorized to sell, and the words “for purposes,” etc., do not limit his power.

Ouster by Tenant in Common.—If, in ejectment, the parties are tenants in common, and the defendant in his answer denies the plaintiff’s title and right of entry, the denial is proof of an ouster.

Review of Evidence.—The Supreme Court will not review the evidence to see whether the finding of the jury is sustained by the evidence if the hill of exceptions does not specify that the evidence was insufficient.

By the Court: It is not necessary to inquire whether the record of the Spanish document, purporting to be a deed from Manuel Jimeno to* Thomas 0. Larkin and John S. Missroon "was erroneously admitted in evidence. Both parties to the present action claim to deraign title from Larkin and Missroon, and the conveyance to them from Jimeno was not necessary to the plaintiff’s case. If, therefore, the court below erred in admitting the record, it was an error "which could not have injured the defendant.

The deed from Larkin and Missroon contains a sufficient description of the land in controversy, the same being part of the “town of Colusa.”

The power of attorney from Larkin, Missroon, Seawell, and Hastings to Carpenter was properly acknowledged by Sea-well. There is no proof in the record that Eames, who pretended to acknowledge its execution for Larkin and Missroon, as their “agent,” was in fact such.

[201]At the trial, the plaintiff swore that he did not have the possession of the power of attorney. But there' was no proof of the execution of the power by Hastings. (Code of Civil Proc., Sec. 1855.) Nevertheless, the certified copy of the power was admissible, the same having been duly acknowledged by Seawell.

The objections taken by defendant to the instrument purporting to be a deed of conveyance from Larkin, Missroon, Seawell, Hastings (by Carpenter, attorney), and Hughes to Chenery and Hazelton, were:

1. That Carpenter had no power to execute it.

2. That the acknowledgment was insufficient.

3. That the deed was not in pursuance of the- power.

1. Carpenter derived power from Seawell through the letter of attorney above mentioned.

2. The acknowledgment substantially complied with-the statute.

3. If the conveyance from Seawell, by Carpenter as attorney in fact, was on condition, it was on condition subsequent, and passed the title to the grantees therein named. But the power of Carpenter, under the letters of attorney, was not limited to the making of conveyances which should recite that they were made “for purposes of actual improvement,” etc. He was authorized “to sell and dispose of” any lots—and the words do not constitute a limitation of his general power.

Spect v. Gregg

AI Brief

Synopsis

More from California Supreme Court

Related research

AI Brief