Morris v. De Celis
Before: Rhodes, Wallace
Synopsis
Title by Statute of Limitations.—An adverse possession of the defendant in ejectment, if continued for five years, creates a title in him to the land so possessed.
Specification in Statement.—If the statement of the plaintiff on motion for a new trial, specifies as a reason why a new trial should be granted, that “ there is no evidence to show that the title ever has been in the defendant,” it is sufficient to enable the Court to review the evidence as to the defendant’s title by adverse possession.
Peima Faoie Evidence.—The fact that the mayor of a city has no knowledge of the issuance by the United States of a patent for the pueblo lands of the city, is prima facie evidence that no such patent has been issued.
Limitation of Action as to Spanish Geants.— The owners of grants of land by Mexico or Spain, which grants had not been finally confirmed by the United States more than five years before the passage of the act of April 18, 1863, amending the Statute of Limitations, had five years after the passage of said act of 1863 in which to commence actions for the recovery of the same.
Final Confibmation of Mexican Geant.—After the passage of the act of Congress of June 14, 1860, giving the United States District Court authority over surveys, a judicial approval of a survey was a final confirmation within the intent of the sixth section of the Statute of Limitations of this State, as amended in 1855.
Statute of Limitations as to Mexican Gbant.—The party claiming title under a Mexican grant, if the other relies on five years’ adverse possession, must show that the patent has not issued for the same, or that the official survey has not been approved by the District Court under the act of Congress of June 14, 1860.
Suevey of Mexican Geant.—If the final confirmation of a Mexican grant was made by the Board of United States Land Commissioners, and not by the District Court, the District Court had no jurisdiction under the act of Congress of June 14, 1860, to adjudicate on the survey, unless the survey had been returned into Court and remained pending there at the time of the passage of the act.
Bukden of Pkoof in Ejectment fob Mexican Geant.—If, in ejectment to recover land granted by Mexico, it appears that the final confirmation was made by the Board of Land Commissioners, it devolves on the defendant, if he claims under five years’ adverse possession, to show that at the time of the passage of the act of Congress of June 14, I860, the survey was pending in the District Court for confirmation, in order to rebut the presumption that the survey had npt been finally confirmed by the District Court.
Opinion — Wallace
By the Court, Wallace, C. J.: 1. Aside from the effect of the Statute of Limitations, the . verdict for the defendant cannot be supported.
The first specification of the grounds of the motion for a new trial is that “ the evidence was insufficient to justify the verdict in this: that the title to the land in controversy . vested in Henry Hancock in 1855, and since then by proper mesne conveyances vested and is now in the plaintiff in this action. There is no evidence to show that the title has ever been in the defendant.” The premises were confirmed to the city of Los Angeles by the Board of United States Land Commissioners in 1856, and the decree of confirmation became final in 1858 by the dismissal of the appeal taken by the Government to the District Court of the United States. The title of the plaintiffs is derived from the city of Los Angeles through Hancock, who received a conveyance thereof from the city in 1855.
No question is made as to the validity of the deed to Hancock, nor is it denied that the title óf the latter, derived from the city, is vested in the plaintiffs. The only title claimed by the defendant, irrespective of such title as he asserts by reason of the alleged adverse possession by his intestate for the statutory period, is derived through a conveyance made to him by the city in 1861, some six years subsequently to the making of the deed by the city to Hancock, the grantor of the plaintiff. There is not the slightest conflict in the evidence in these respects, and unless the verdict of the jury can be supported upon the supposed title of the defendant’s intestate arising upon his adverse possession of the premises, a new trial should have been granted.
2. It is clear, however, that the adverse possession of the intestate of the defendant did not constitute a defense to [60]the action. The question of the sufficiency of the evidence in this respect is presented by the latter clause of the specification of grounds of the motion for a new trial, which has already been cited: “ There is no evidence to show that the title ever has been in the defendant.” It is settled in this Court that the adverse possession of the defendant in an action of ejectment, if continued for the statutory period, creates a title in him to the lands so possessed, and under this specification it will be intended that the record contains all the evidence to establish a title in the defendant’s intestate by reason of his adverse possession of the premises sued for.
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