Hartman v. Reed

California Supreme Court Jul 1, 1875 No. No. 3222Published

Before: Crockett

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Holding. The court held that a plaintiff owning an undivided interest in land cannot maintain an action to remove a cloud on title based on a deed that does not necessarily conflict with their own interest, as the defendant's claim could be valid without impairing the plaintiff's title. Furthermore, the court determined that adverse possession extinguishes a prior title but does not transfer it to the possessor, and a deed attempting to convey the specific interest previously held by a third party is ineffective if that interest has been extinguished.

Issues

Whether a party holding an undivided interest in land can maintain an action to set aside a deed as a cloud on title when the deed does not necessarily conflict with their own interest.
Whether adverse possession by a grantor extinguishes a previously conveyed title and allows the grantor to convey that specific interest to a new party.
Whether a deed describing an interest previously conveyed to another party is effective if that interest has been extinguished by adverse possession.

Disposition. reversed

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“The effect of such adverse possession was to extinguish the title which Olvera had conveyed to Crosby, in whosesoever hands it might be, at the time the Statute of Limitations had completely run.”

Synopsis

CONVEYANCE OF LAND IN CONSIDERATION OF CONTRACT TO PERFORM SERVICES.—If one conveys to another a tract of land, part of a Mexican grant, in consideration of an agreement by the other to prosecute the claim before the courts for final confirmation, and the grantee fails to fulfill his agreement, the title vests absolutely, and the remedy of the grantor for the breach of the agreement is an action for damages.

Statute of Limitations.—If the grantee of a Mexican grant conveys an undivided, interest in the same, and, after the conveyance is made, holds possession of the whole of the grant, adversely to all the world, for the period required by the Statute of Limitations, the title which he has conveyed is extinguished.

Idem.—The court does not apply the above principle to a case where a patent from the United States has issued within the period of the statute, if the grantee was entitled to the benefit of the patent.

Construction of Deed.—If, after the owner of a Mexican grant of land has conveyed an undivided one-third of the same, he retains adverse possession until the title of the grantee is extinguished, and then executes a conveyance to another party of “ the interest in said lands or rancho heretofore conveyed” to said grantee, and “all the undivided third part of ” the whole tract of land and rancho, the latter conveyance vests in the grantee, not the particular third first conveyed, but an undivided third, without distinguishing which third.

Action to remove Cloud on Tule.—In an action to set aside a deed as a cloud upon the title of the plaintiff, it is not enough that the deed which is sought to be set aside may possibly be a cloud on the plaintiff’s title, but it must clearly appear that the claim set up under such deed is, in fact, in hostility to the plaintiff’s title.

Idem.—If the owner of a tract of land conveys an undivided one-third of the same, without designating what third, the grantee cannot maintain an action to remove, as a cloud on his title, a claim set np by another party to a particular undivided third of the tract.

Opinion

By the Court : It is satisfactorily shown that, in the year 1854, Olvera, by deed of bargain and sale, conveyed to E. O. Crosby the undivided third of the Rancho Cuyamaca; that the only consideration therefor was the agreement of Crosby to prosecute to a final determination before the Board of Land Commissioners and the courts of the United States, the claim of Olvera to the said rancho, and that Crosby failed to perform his agreement. The title to the undivided third of the rancho vested absolutely in Crosby, and his agreement did not constitute a condition, upon a breach of which [489]the title would revest in Olvera; but a breach of the agreement only gave Olvera a cause of action for damages. The title to the undivided third of the rancho was conveyed, in 1855, by Crosby to S. J. Crosby, and remained in him until his death, on the 29th of March, 1859.

On the 28th of April, 1869, Olvera executed to the plaintiff a conveyance, by which the former purported to convey to the latter “the interest in said lands or rancho heretofore conveyed as aforesaid to said Elisha O. Crosby, and which is described as follows, to wit: All the undivided one-third part of that tract of land and rancho, in the county of San Diego, called Cuyamaca.” The deed recites that Crosby had agreed with Olvera to prosecute his claim to the rancho and procure a patent, in consideration of which Olvera agreed to convey to Crosby one undivided third of the rancho which should be confirmed and patented, which agreement was evidenced by a deed executed by Olvera and a “defeasance” executed by Crosby. But no defeasance was, in fact, executed by Crosby, nor did Olvera agree to convey the undivided third of tho land to Crosby—the recital being a misdescription of the deed and agreement between Olvera and Crosby, first above mentioned. It is alleged in the complaint, and found by the court, that Olvera, from November, 1859, to April 28, 1869, held the possession of the whole of the rancho, adversely to all the world, and that since that day Olvera and the plaintiff have held such adverse possession, and the evidence is sufficient to sustain that finding. The effect of such adverse possession was to extinguish the title which Olvera had conveyed to Crosby, in whosesoever hands it might be, at the time the Statute of Limitations had completely run. We are not to be understood, however, as holding that such adverse possession would have any effect as against a patent to the rancho subsequently issued, if Crosby and his grantees are entitled to the benefits of the patent. It did not retransfer the title of Crosby to Olvera, but, as we have often held, it extinguished it, and thus the entire title to the rancho was left in Olvera. That was the condition of the title, as shown by the finding, at the date of the deed of Olvera to the

Hartman v. Reed

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