Paty v. Smith
Before: McKinstry
Synopsis
Poweb of Legislature oveb Estates of Infants.—The Court has grave doubts whether the Legislature has power to authorize or direct the sale, by a stranger, of the real estate of an infant, and whether the matter of the appointment of guardians of infants, and the disposition of their estates, is not exclusively of judicial cognizance, but does not decide the question.
Act empo weeing a Pebson to sell Land of a Minob.—An act which authorizes a person by name, as guardian of a minor, to sell the real estate of such minor and receive the purchase-money therefor, and to execute a conveyance after a confirmation of the sale by the Probate Court, and directs such person to account for the proceeds of sale in the same manner as the other assets of the minor in his hands, does not confer upon such person the power of selling such estate as an individual, but in his capacity as guardian, nor does it appoint such person a guardian, hut contemplates his appointment as guardian by the Probate Court, and merely dispenses with the conditions required by the general law to authorize a sale.
Idem.—A sale of the real estate of a minor made by such person upon the presumed authority conferred by such act, without his previous appointment as guardian by the Probate Court in accordance with the general statutes upon that subject, is void.
CoNSTEtrcnoN of an Act.—An act authorizing a person to sell the real estate of an infant will not be construed as freeing such person from the supervision of the Probate Court under the general laws, unless its language clearly and explicitly requires such construction.
By the Court, McKinstry, J.: While entertaining grave doubt in respect to the point, we shall assume, for the purposes of this decision, that the Legislature has power to authorize or direct the sale, by a stranger, of the real estate of a minor; that the matter of the appointment of guardians of infants, and the disposition of the estates of such, is not exclusively of judicial cognizance, to be referred to a court of appropriate jurisdiction, but is one which may, in any instance, be directly regulated by the legislative department of the government. It is not necessary to determine the constitutional question suggested, because we are convinced that the act, on the construction of which the main point in this case turns, is not an attempt to confer the power of sale on Martha Ann Paty Dayley, as an individual, but to confer upon her the power of making private sales in her capacity as guardian of the estate of the infant, Francis William Paty.
Independently of any question of constitutionality, we would not be justified in saying that it was the intention of the Legislature to authorize an adult who had given, and was required to give no bond or security, to sell the real estate of an infant, and to appropriate the proceeds, freed of the supervision of any court or officer, unless the language conferring that dangerous power should be clear and explicit. We cannot assume such intention upon any ambiguous phraseology. The person named in the act was never appointed guardian in this State; never gave bond to secure the proper application of any fund that might come into her hands; and (if we adopt the construction of the respondent) while the Probate Judge was given power to disapprove of [159]a sale—that is, to require that a larger sum should be realized and paid to the guardian, so called—he had no power to interfere for the protection of the infant, by directing or supervising the use of the proceeds.
At the time the act under consideration was passed there was a general law providing for the appointment of guardians, requiring bonds, the rendition of accounts, and proof to the satisfaction of the Probate Court of the necessity and propriety of sales, and conferring on the Probate Court or Judge a controlling direction over the property and proceeds. Acts had been passed, however, authorizing particular guardians, duly appointed and qualified, to sell the real estate of their wards, without the formalities or conditions required by the general law. We do not decide whether such special laws are constitutional; we think, however, the Legislature, by the act under consideration, intended to follow these precedents.
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