Clark v. Clark
Before: Wallace
Synopsis
Enforcement of Vebbab Contract to give Lease.-—If the owner of land makes a verbal agreement with another to lease him the same for one year, with the privilege of two years more, at an annual rent of six hundred dollars, and a lease is to be executed containing the usual covenants, and the lessee takes possession and pays the rent for the first year, the agreement is sufficiently certain to support a decree against the lessor for a specific performance.
Agreement of Lessee to Pebsonabby Occupy.—If the lessee agrees with the lessor that he will personally occupy the land leased, the entry of the lessee upon the premises, and their occupancy by him by his agent, is a compliance with the agreement.
Obdinaby Covenants in a Lease.—If the lessor and lessee agree that a lease shall he drawn containing the ordinary covenants, such covenants do not embrace a covenant that the lessee shall personally occupy the premises, or that he will not cultivate the land by his agents or employes.
Lessee may Act by Attorney in Fact.—If the lessor agrees verbally to lease land one year, with a privilege of two, and to sign a written lease, and the lease is to be drawn by a conveyancer and signed afterwards, and the lessee gives a third person a power of attorney to execute the lease and transact the business and pay the rent, the attorney in fact may tender the rent and execute the lease and complete the transaction.
By the Court, Wallace, C. J.: 1. The terms of the agreement for a lease were sufficiently certain in themselves to support a decree for specific performance.
2. The plaintiff had received $600 for which he had delivered to the defendant a receipt: “Six hundred dollars on account of lease to be drawn by F. W. Shattuck, according to our agreement stated before him.”
3. The entry of the defendant, Clark, upon the premises, and their occupancy by him for the first year by his agent, Dake, is equivalent to his personal occupation. There was no promise on his part that he would personally occupy; and the “ordinary covenants,” which the conveyancer was instructed to insert in the instrument of lease, would not embrace a covenant for exclusive personal occupation upon the part of the lessee, or that he would not conduct the farm by agents or employees.
4. The tender of the rent due for the second year was well made. There had been no laches upon the part of the defendant, and the act of Dake in making the trade was, under the letter of attorney of November 9, 1872, the act of his principal, the defendant Clark.
[590]The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded, with directions to render a decree for the specific performance -of the agreement by the plaintiff.
Neither Mr. Justice Crockett nor Mr. Justice McKinstry expressed an opinion.
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