Wilcoxson v. Miller

By the Court, Rhodes, J.: The plaintiffs appear to claim title under two Sheriff’s deeds, which purport to have been executed in pursuance of sales of the premises, as the property of Morton. The first deed was made to the plaintiffs as redemptioners—-they claiming to hold a judgment lien upon the premises, subsequent to the decree of foreclosure under which the sale was made, and they having paid to the Sheriff a sum of money sufficient to effect the redemption.

A judgment becomes a lien upon, real estate from the time it is docketed (Pr. Act, Sec. 204); and it is provided by Section 234 of the Practice Act that a person claiming the right to redeem under a judgment shall produce to the officer from whom he seeks to redeem, a copy of the docket of the judgment. The Sheriff’s deed does not recite that the plaintiffs produced a copy of the docket of their judgment; nor was it shown aliunde that such copy was produced. When the redemption is attempted to be effected through the Sheriff, he has no authority, either to receive the redemption money from one claiming the right to redeem under a judgment, or to execute á deed to him, unless the redemptioner produces a copy of the docket of his judgment. His power is altogether statutory, and his acts are nugatory, unless the provisions of the statute are pursued. The transcript of the plaintiffs’ judgment, which was produced to the Sheriff, is not the equivalent of a copy of the docket of the judgment. The deed therefore did not transfer to the plaintiffs the title of Morton to the mortgaged premises.

The second deed was executed in pursuance of a sale, made under an execution, issued upon the plaintiffs’ judgment above mentioned. That deed transferred to the [195]plaintiffs all the title which Morton then held in the premises therein described. Mesick executed to Morton a deed, dated November 19, 1858, by which he conveyed all his right, title, and interest, etc., in and to a large tract of land, which includes the larger part, if not all, of the lands in controversy; and on the same day Morton executed to Mesick a deed by which he reconveyed to the latter the undivided half of the same interest and estate. The deed of Morton to Mesick was recorded after the plaintiffs’ judgment was docketed, but before the deed of the Sheriff to the plaintiffs was recorded. The plaintiffs’ claim that the Sheriff’s deed has priority over that of Morton to Mesick, on the ground that the lien of their judgment is a conveyance, within the meaning of the Registry Act. But there is nothing in the Act which gives countenance to that position; and there is no ground upon which the priority claimed for their judgment lien can be maintained.