Thompson v. True
Before: Rhodes
Synopsis
Title of State to Sixteenth and Thibty-Sixth Sections.—An Act of' Congress, passed after March 3, ^1853, permitting the purchasers from the claimant of a rejected Mexican grant, to enter the land included within the boundaries of the grant; at one dollar and twenty-five cents, per acre, does not divest the State of its title to the sixteenth and thirty-sixth sections within the grant; and a patent issued by the United States under said Act, to one of such purchasers, of a sixteenth orthirtyrsixth section, does not convey the title.
Estoppel by Judgment.—If the matters determined by a judgment against a defendant are set forth in the complaint, the question, as to whether the defendant is estopped by it, arises on the complaint.
Kefebence of Land Contest to Distbict Coubt fob Tbial.—If an application is made to the Register of' the State Land Office to purchase land, and a protest is filed on the ground that the State has no title, and that the title is in the protestant, and that he has the better right to purchase, and a contest arises before the State Register, which he refers to the District Court for trial, and an action is commenced in'the District Court, it has jurisdiction to determine the question whether the State has title to the land.
Estoppel by Judgment in Case op Contest to Purchase Land. — If a party makes an application to the Register of the State Land Office to purchase a sixteenth or thirty-sixth section of public land, and one who has obtained a patent to the land from the United States files a protest, claiming that the title is not in the State, and that he has the better right to purchase, and the contest is referred to the District Court for trial, and the District Court adjudges that the title to the land is not in the State, and that neither party has a right to purchase the land from the State, and the applicant afterwards obtains a patent from the State, the applicant is estopped by the judgment from averring that the patent from the State vested in him the title to the land, and from denying that the patent issued by the United States transferred to the patentee the title to the land, and the patent issued by the State is void.
JPatent to Land in the Suscol Ranch.—Although the Afct of Congress granting the right to purchasers from Vallejo, of land on the so-called Suscol Ranch, to purchase from the United States, does not expressly provide for a patent to issue to the purchaser; still a patent must issue, as the usual mode of transmitting the legal title. The patent issued by the United States to a piu-chaser of land which was a part of the so-called Suscol Ranch, cannot be attacked by a private person on the ground that the -patentee had not the requisite possession to entitle him to purchase under the Suscol Act, unless such person connects himself with the title to the land,
By the Court, Rhodes, J.: The land in controversy is a part of a thirty-sixth section, and by virtue of the Act of Congress of March 3, 1853, as we construed it in Sherman v. Buick (45 Cal. 656), the title vested in the State; and by means of the State patent, the title was transferred to the defendant, unless the operation and effect of the judgment in Morris v. True,, which is set up in the complaint, precluded the defendant from relying on title derived from the State.
[608]It is unnecessary to notice any of the preliminary objections of the plaintiff, to the effect that the answer- raises no issue as to the judgment in Morris v. True; and .that in the motion for a new trial there is no specification which calls in question the implied finding in favor of the. jdaintiff upon the issue in respect to the judgment, for the matters determined by that judgment are set forth in the complaint, and thereupon the question arises as to whether the defendant is thereby estopped to aver title in himself derived through his patent from the State.
It is averred that the defendant made application to purchase the lands from the State; that the plaintiffs in that case filed with the Register of the State Land Office their protest, etc., on the ground that the title was vested in them, and that the State had no title; and on the further ground that they had the prior right to purchase the lands from the State. After stating that a contest arose-before the State Register; that it was referred to the District Court; that an Action was instituted, in which the defendant appeared, etc., it is averred that a judgment was duly made and entered, whereby it was adjudged that the legal title to the premises was vested in the plaintiffs, under their patent from the United States; that the State had no title or interest therein, and that the defendant was not entitled to receive from the State Register a certificate of purchase. Upon looking into the judgment, it is .found that in addition to the matters averred in the complaint, it is adjudged that neither party is entitled, under his application, to purchase the lands from the State; and that the defendant have judgment for his costs. After the entry of that judgment, the State Register issued to the defendant a certificate of purchase, and subsequently a patent was issued to him by the State.
The defendant contends that the Court had no jurisdiction to decide the question of title—that is to say, to determine whether the title' had vested in the State—that the issue referred was necessarily confined to the question as to which of the applicants had the better right to make the purchase from the State. If this proposition be not sus
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