Jones v. Marks

California Supreme Court Jul 1, 1874 No. No. 3,056Published

Before: Crockett

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Holding. The court held that the power of attorney was entitled to recordation because it authorized the agent to execute instruments affecting real estate, such as leases exceeding one year, and that the subsequent sale, payment, and possession created a valid equitable title.

Issues

Whether a power of attorney authorizing an agent to manage real estate and enter into contracts was entitled to recordation under the Act of 1850.
Whether a deed executed by an agent without authority to convey fee title, when accompanied by payment and possession, creates a valid equitable title.

Disposition. affirmed

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“If these views be correct, the power of attorney was entitled to record, and the certified copy was properly admitted in evidence.”

“there was, nevertheless, a valid verbal sale, accompanied by a payment of the purchase money and a delivery of possession, which has ever since continued. This created a valid, equitable title”

Synopsis

Coksibuction of Poweb of Attobney.—A power of attorney in which the principal authorizes the agent to make contracts, to settle outstanding debts, and generally to do all things that concern his interest in any way, real and personal, to use the principal’s name to release others, to bind the principal as he may deem proper and expedient, and making the agent his general attorney and agent, and ratifying and confirming whatever the attorney may do by virtue of the power, authorizes- the attorney to execute a lease of the principal’s real estate for a term exceeding one year, and to execute any instrument affecting the real estate of the principal, unless, it may be, a conveyance of it.

Becobd and Powees oe Atiobney.—By the Act of 1850 concerning conveyances, powers of attorney which do not authorize the agent to make an absolute conveyance of real estate, but which authorize him to make a lease of the principal’s land for a term exceeding one year, or to make any other instrument affecting the real estate of the principal, except executory contracts for the sale thereof, are entitled to record.

A Lease a Conveyance.—A lease for a term exceeding one year is a “ conveyance” within the definition of that word, as used in Sections 27 and 36 of the recording Act of 1850.

Cebtieied Copy op Becobd as Evidence.—A certified copy of the record of a power of attorney, which is entitled to record, is admissible in evidence.

Veebal Sale of Land which Gives Purchases an Equitable Title.—If an attorney in fact, who is not authorized by the power to execute an absolute deed of the land of his principal, but who is authorized by the power to execute a contract for the sale of the land, sells the land, receives the purchase money, places the purchaser in possession, and executes an absolute deed for it, the transaction amounts to a valid verbal sale, and creates a valid equitable title in the purchaser and his successors in interest.

Possession of Land, Notice of Equitable Title.—The actual possession of land, by one who has acquired an equitable title, is notice of such title to subsequent purchasers from the one holding the legal title.

By the Court, Crockett, J.: The action is ejectment for a lot in the city of Sacramento, in which a judgment was entered for the defendant, from which, and from an order denying his motion for a new trial, the plaintiff appealed. At the trial the defendant offered, and the Court admitted in evidence, against the objection of the plaintiff, a certified copy from the “School-craft Becords” of a power of attorney from Sutter to School-craft, dated July 28th, 1849. The power of attorney authorized Schoolcraft, for and in the name of Sutter, to superintend his real and personal estate, “to make contracts,” to settle outstanding debts, and generally to do all things that concerned his interest in any way, real and personal, giving his said attorney full power to use his name to release others, to bind Sutter as he might deem proper and expedient, and concluding in these words: “Hereby making the said Schoolcraft my general attorney and agent, and by these presents ratifying whatever my said attorney may do by virtue of this power.” This power was recorded in the books of record kept by Schoolcraft prior to the organization of the State Government, and the certified copy admitted in evidence was taken from these records. For the purpose of validating these records, it was provided by the Act of May 18th, 1853 (Statutes 1853, p. 227), that “the books of record used by Henry A. Schoolcraft for the record of deeds and other instruments in writing, deposited in the Becorder’s office of said county, shall, on and after the 1st day of June, 1853, be deemed legal records, and all instruments therein recorded shall have the same force and effect in law as if duly recorded in the appropriate books of record of said county, at 12 o’clock M. of the said 1st day of June; and all copies thereof duly certified or proved shall thereafter have the same force and effect as other copies of records of said office.”

[246]The next section provides that “the record of all deeds and other instruments required by law to be recorded, and which are recorded in any of said books, shall, after 12 o’clock M. of said 1st day of June, as in other cases provided by law, be constructive notice to all persons of the contents thereof.”

The plaintiff contends that the purpose of the act was to validate the record of only such instruments, as at the time of the passage of the act, were, by law, required to be recorded; and he claims that the power of attorney from Sutter to Schoolcraft does not come within that category; and, consequently, that a certified copy of it was not admissible in evidence. . Without discussing the first branch of the proposition, and assuming for the purposes of this decision that it is correct, we proceed to inquire whether the power of attorney was entitled to record as the law stood at the time of the passage of the curative act.

Jones v. Marks

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