People v. Strong
Synopsis
Indictment fob Larceny.—In an indictment for larceny, for stealing a cow, it is sufficient to charge that the defendant “did steal, take, and cariy away,” without adding the words “lead, or drive away.”
Concluding Argument to Jury in Criminal Case.—When other counsel are associated with the District Attorney in the prosecution of a criminal case, the Court may, in its discretion, for good reasons, allow the associate counsel to conclude the argument.
Idem.—Iu such case, nothing appearing in the record to the contrary, the presumption is that the Court had good reason for allowing associate counsel to conclude the argument.
Attempt to Escape when Arrested for Larceny.—If a person, when arrested on a charge of larceny, and after being informed of the cause of his arrest, escapes, or attempts to escape, it is a circumstance that the jury may consider in determining his guilt or innocence.
Alleged Error in Instructions to the Jury.—If the testimony is not in the record, a judgment in a criminal case will not be reversed for alleged error in instructions, if, from the nature of the case, testimony might have been introduced which would have warranted the instructions.
By the Court: The defendant was indicted for the crime of grand larceny. In the indictment it is charged that he feloniously “did steal, take, and carry away a cow,” etc. It is objected that the words “lead or drive away” should have been used.
We think the indictment clearly sufficient.
At the conclusion of the testimony, the argument to the [303]jury was opened by the District Attorney and concluded by R. McGarvey, who was associated with the District Attorney in conducting the prosecution. Counsel for defendant objected to McGarvey’s being permitted to conclude the argument, but the Court overruled the objection.
Section ten hundred and ninety-three of the Penal Code provides that the District Attorney, or other counsel for the people, must open, and the District Attorney may conclude the argument. The next section provides that this order may be changed when the state of the pleadings requires it, or in any other case for good reasons and in the sound discretion of the Court.
Nothing to the contrary appearing, we must presume that the Court wisely, and for good reasons, exercised its discretion in this case in permitting associate counsel to conclude the argument.
At the request of the District Attorney, the Court gave to the jury the instruction, which reads as follows:
“ If the jury find, from the evidence, that the defendant was arrested for the crime charged in the indictment, and after such arrest escaped, or attempted to escape, from the persons having him under arrest, it is a circumstance that the jury may well consider in determining the guilt or innocence of the party.”
It is claimed that this instruction is erroneous, because, if the defendant escaped, or attempted to escape, after he was arrested for the crime charged in the indictment, it may be he did so while ignorant of the cause of his arrest; and the fact of his escape ought not, therefore, to be considered as a circumstance in determining his guilt or innocence.
The testimony is not in the record, and we are not, therefore, informed of the circumstances attending the supposed escape. In People v. Donahue, 45 Cal. 321, it was held that if any state of facts might have been proved in view of [304]
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