Oakland Cotton Manufacturing Co. v. Jennings
Before: Crockett
Synopsis
Liability of Charterer of a Vessel.— If a vessel is chartered in the usual way, either for a particular voyage or for a period of time, the charterer having authority to appoint the master, and undertaking to victual, man, and navigate her at his own expense, he will be deemed the owner pro hao vice, and the general owner will not be personally liable on contracts of affreightment or for supplies.
Liability of Owner of Vessel.—If the owner charters the hold of his vessel, but appoints her master and sails her at his own expense, he will be liable on contracts of affreightment made by the master with shippers who have no notice of the charter party.
Liability of Owner of Vessel for Contracts of Master. — If the registered owner of a vessel appoints her master, with an agreement that the master is to have the entire control of the vessel, and victual and man her, and make contracts of affreightment, and divide the gross earnings with the owner, the owner is liable on contracts of affreightment made by the master with shippers who have no notice of the arrangement between the master and owner.
By the Court, Crockett, J.: The defendant being the owner of the American schooner Greenfield, caused her to be duly enrolled at the port of San Francisco, with one Enos as master. Subsequently he appointed Horton as master in place of Enos; but whether the change of masters was reported at the Custom House and noted or recorded, does not appear. Some time after Horton took command of the schooner the defendant entered into an agreement with him to the effect that Horton was to have the entire control and mangement of her; was to make whatever contracts of affreightment he saw fit; to employ her in any business he desired, within the inland waters of the State; to victual, man, and navigate her at his own expense, and to collect all her earnings; and to pay to the defendant one third of her gross earnings, at the end of each month, or as often as a settlement was had between them— the defendant to keep the schooner seaworthy and in repair. Subsequently Horton entered into an agreement with one Finney, to the effect that the schooner was to be run for their joint benefit, under the contract with the defendant, and thereafter she was controlled and managed by the two jointly.
The plaintiff contracted with Finney, acting on behalf of himself and Horton, to transport certain machinery, on the schooner, from San Francisco to Clinton, on the opposite side of the bay. But owing to negligent stowage, the schooner capsized during the voyage, and the machinery was partially lost, and the remainder damaged. The action is to recover damages for a breach of the contract of affreightment. On these facts, the defendant insists that he is not liable, for the reason that the schooner was not under his control or man[183]agement, or navigated by his servant or agents, but by Horton & Finney, under the contract, they having the exclusive control and possession of her, with a right to make such contracts of affreightment as they saw proper; that Horton was in no sense the agent of the owner, with authority to bind him in maritime contracts, without his consent. On the other hand, the plaintiff claims that, by the maritime law, the master appointed by the owner is his agent to make contracts of affreightment, and that no secret agreement between the master and owner, of which the shipper had no notice, can exempt the owner from liability.
It appears to be well settled, that if a vessel be chartered in the usual manner, either for a particular voyage or for a period of time, the charterer having the authority to appoint the master, and undertaking to victual, man, and navigate her at his own expense, Tie will be deemed the owner pro hac vice, and the general owner will not be personally liable for supplies, or under contracts of affreightment. This proceeds upon the ground, that as the charterer appoints the master and has the exclusive control of the vessel, the master is his agent and not the agent of the general owner, who does not, therefore, hold himself out to the world as the principal for whom the master is authorized to act. In respect to a contract of affreightment, the general owner in such a case would not be liable, for the further reason, that inasmuch, as the vessel was not navigated by him, or at his expense, or by his agents or servants, or for his benefit, he was not a.common carrier, and was, therefore, not amenable as such. I do not understand the counsel for the plaintiff to controvert these propositions; but, at all events, they are abundantly supported by authorityin this country and in England. It is equally clear that if the owner let out to charter the hold of~the vessel, appointing his own master, and sailing her at Ms expense, he will be responsible on contracts of affreightment made by the master with the shippers, hav
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