Porter v. Haight

California Supreme Court Jul 1, 1873 No. No. 2,773Published

Before: Niles

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Holding. The Board of Directors of the State Prison may terminate convict labor contracts when necessary to fulfill their statutory duties, and they are not personally liable for such discretionary acts absent fraud or malice.

Issues

Whether the Board of Directors has the power to enter into contracts for convict labor that limit their statutory control over the prison.
Whether the Board of Directors is personally liable for damages resulting from the termination of a convict labor contract in the exercise of their discretion.

Disposition. affirmed

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“A public officer is not liable to an action if he falls into error in a case where the act to be done is not merely a ministerial one, but is one in relation to which it is his duty to exercise judgment and discretion”

Synopsis

Contracts for Employment of Convict Labor.—Conceding that the Board of State Prison Directors have power to enter into contracts for the employment of convict labor, that power must he limited by the requirements of the Act creating the Board and prescribing its powers and duties.

Idem:.—The Board of State Prison Directors have no power under said Act to enter into any contract for the employment of convict labor that would deprive it in any degree of the full and exclusive control of the prisoners and prison labor, or of the prison grounds, buildings, and property.

Idem.—If the Board of State Prison Directors enter into a contract for the employment of convict labor, which is not void under the above rule, they have the right to terminate it whenever in their judgment the proper exercise of the powers conferred upon them may require it.

Liability of Prison Directors for Annulling Contract.—Whether the exigence of a particular case requires the Board of Prison Directors to annul a contract they have made for the employment of convict labor, is a question which addresses itself to their judgment, and their determination on the matter is in the nature of a judicial and not of a ministerial act, and for which, if they act without fraud or malice, they do not incur personal liability.

Power of Courts Over Public Officers.—When the State, by legislative Act, confers upon a Board of public officers jurisdiction to exercise their judgment and discretion upon matters within their power to perform, the Courts cannot review the question whether that discretion was properly exercised.

By the Court, Niles, J.: We have not been referred to, nor can we find any statute which directly authorizes the Board of Directors to enter into any contract for the employment of convict labor. The Act of April 24th, 1858, prescribing the powers and duties of the Board, contains no such authorization. This power may, perhaps, be inferred from the general power, given to the Board by this Act, to manage and control the convicts and prison labor, and from an implied recognition by the Legislature of the validity of such contracts contained in section three of the Act of April 4th, 1864, relating to the pardon of criminals, which provides that “ every contractor employing convict labor shall keep a record of the conduct of all prisoners employed by them,” etc. (Stats. 1863-4, p. 356.)

Conceding, for the purposes of this case, the existence of the power, its extent, being undefined by any statute especially relating to that matter, must be limited by the requirements of the Act creating the Board, and prescribing its powers and duties. (Stats. 1858, p. 259.)

Section one constitutes the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, and Secretary of State a Board of Directors, and makes it their duty to take charge of the State Prison, and have the management and control of “ State Prison convicts.”

Section three provides that “said Board shall have full and exclusive control of all the State Prison grounds, buildings, prisoners, prison labor, prison property, and all other things belonging or pertaining to said State Prison.”

It is evident that the Board would have no power to enter into any contract for the employment of convict labor, or for [638]any other purpose, that would deprive them in any degree of the full and exclusive control of the prisoners and prison labor, or of the grounds, buildings, and property with which they are charged by the Act. To that extent, at least, any such contract would be inoperative and void.

It seems to us equally clear, that if at any time after the making of a contract originally free from the vice we have mentioned, circumstances should arise which would, in the judgment of the Directors, render the continuance of the contract incompatible with the safety of the convicts, or the proper management of the prison, it would be their right and duty to terminate it. This is a power of which they cannot deprive themselves by contract. It is imposed upon the Board by the Act which created it. For instance ground within the prison walls, and for manufacturing purposes under contract with the Board, might be required for the erection of prison buildings, or a conspiracy might be detected, which, in the judgment of the Board, required the separation or close confinement of prisoners whose labor had been contracted for; would it be said in either case, that it was not in the power of the Board to resume possession of the ground, or control of the prisoners, and thereby effectually annul the contract?

Porter v. Haight

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