People v. Rodundo

California Supreme Court Jul 1, 1872 No. No. 3,369Published

Before: Belcher

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Holding. The court held that procedural irregularities or errors that do not prejudice the defendant's substantial rights do not warrant reversal of a conviction.

Issues

Whether the court erred in instructing a co-defendant witness that his testimony could not be used against him.
Whether the defendant's voluntary statements to the arresting officer were admissible.
Whether the court was required to instruct the jury on the credibility of the defendant's testimony absent a request.
Whether the failure to call the names of the jurors before receiving the verdict constitutes reversible error.

Disposition. affirmed

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“Conceding that the Court was in error in telling him that the evidence he might give could not be used against himself, still the error in no way prejudiced the defendant.”

“It is only when there is something peculiar in the testimony itself, or in the manner of giving it, or in the circumstances surrounding the case, that the action of the Court in this respect is made necessary.”

Synopsis

One Indicted as Accessory a Witness Against the Principal.—One jointly indicted with another, as an accessory after the fact, is a competent witness for the people on the trial of the principal. He is not obliged to criminate himself, but whether he do so or not, is a matter which does not concern the defendant; and he may refuse to testify unless first discharged from the indictment; but this is a matter over which the defendant has no control.

Idem.—An instruction- by the Court to such witness, that his evidence cannot be used against himself, even if erroneous, does not prejudice the defendant.

Sheriff may Testify to Statements of Accused.—The Sheriff may testify to statements made to him by the accused after his arrest, if such statements are made voluntarily, without any threats or promises of reward.

Defendant a Witness in his own Behalf.—If a defendant in a criminal case becomes a witness in his own behalf, and gives testimony tending to exonerate himself, the Court need not, of its own motion, instruct the jury as to the credit to be given to his testimony.

Idem.—The statute declaring that when a defendant in a criminal case becomes a witness in his own behalf, the credit to be given to his testimony must be left solely to the jury, under instructions' of the Court, does not establish a new rule for defendants in criminal cases, but simply applies to them a rule which exists as to other witnesses.

Possession .of Stolen Property.—An instruction to the jury, that “the possession of stolen property is not alone sufficient to convict,” and that' “ it is merely a guilty circumstance which, taken in connection with .other testimony, is to determine the question of guilt,” is not erroneous by.reason of the use of the words “ guilty circumstance.”

Receiving the Verdict of a Jury.—The irregularity of receiving a verdict in a criminal case, without first calling over the names of the jurors, does not prejudice a defendant, if the jury were all present and had agreed.

By the Court, Belcher, J.: The defendant aiid one Camargo were jointly indicted for the crime of grand larceny, the defendant as principal and Camargo as accessory after the fact.

Upon the trial against the defendant, Camargo was called as a witness for the prosecution, and at the instance of the District Attorney, and against the objections of the defendant, instructed by the Court that anything he might testify to could not be used as evidence against himself.

There can be no doubt that he was a competent witness, and might testify to any facts within his knowledge, whether those facts tended to criminate himself or not. He was not obliged to criminate himself, but whether he should do so or not was a matter which concerned him and not the defendant. He might probably have refused to testify at all, unless first discharged from the indictment (Crim. Pr. Act, Sec. 368); but this, too, was a matter over which the defendant had no control. Conceding that the Court was in error in telling him that the evidence he might give could not be used against himself, still the error in no way prejudiced the defendant.

The Sheriff who arrested the defendant was also called as a witness for the prosecution, and testified “ that after he had made the arrest the defendant asked him what he was arrested for. I said, For stealing John Arnett’s cow. He said, Only one cow ? I said, Yes. He replied, That’s not much. Out on the street, after we had gone a little ways, he asked, What did Camargo say? I replied, Ca[540]margo says you stole the cow.- Defendant replied, I did steal the cow; Camargo and his family were starving, and I stole her to get them some meat; Camargo was with me. I used no threats; did not tell him it would be better for him to own up, nor hold out any promise of reward. He stated everything voluntarily.”

The defendant moved to strike out all of this testimony, on the ground that the statements were not voluntary. The Court overruled the motion and the defendant excepted.

The're was no valid objection to the testimony. Nothing-was disclosed tending to show that the statements of the defendant to the witness were not wholly free and voluntary.

The defendant became a witness in his own behalf and gave testimony tending to exonerate himself from the charge made against him. When the Court came to instruct the jury no reference was made to the defendant’s testimony. It is now claimed that the statute, which authorizes defendants in criminal cases to become witnesses, requires the Court to instruct the jury in reference to the credit to be given to their testimony, and that the failure to do so in this case was error. The language of the statute is : “ The credit to be given to his testimony being left solely to the jury under the instructions of the Court.”

People v. Rodundo

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