McCauley v. Fulton

California Supreme Court Jul 1, 1872 No. No. 3,249Published

Before: Belcher

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Holding. The court held that a purchaser of an interest in partnership real estate acquires legal title, which is subject to an equitable lien that must be affirmatively pleaded as a defense in an ejectment action. Furthermore, the court affirmed that the Superior Court of San Francisco was a court of superior jurisdiction whose judgments are entitled to conclusive presumptions of validity on collateral attack.

Issues

Whether a deed naming a partner as a grantee is void under the Statute of Frauds if the property was purchased with partnership funds.
Whether the Superior Court of San Francisco had jurisdiction to serve process by publication.
Whether recitals of service in a judgment from a court of record are conclusive on collateral attack.
Whether a purchaser of partnership real estate may be denied possession in an ejectment action without the defendant pleading an equitable lien.

Disposition. affirmed

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“The legal title to an undivided fourth of the lot nevertheless passed to him, incumbered only by an equitable lien in favor of the other partners.”

“It is settled here that an equitable defense to an action of ejectment must be distinctly pleaded and proved.”

“All the intendments are in favor of the judgment. In order to attack it collaterally, its invalidity must appear on the face of the record.”

Synopsis

Conveyance oe Land to Partners.—When a deed is executed to four persons, naming them, and then describing them as composing the firm of “ Graff, Fulton & Co.,” and the four persons compose a partnership, and the property conveyed is paid for with partnership funds, and used for partnership purposes, the deed is not void as to either of the grantees, under the Statute of Frauds, but conveys .the legal title to an undivided one fourth of the property to each of the four grantees, incumbered only by an equitable lien in favor of the other partners.

Jurisdiction op Superior Court op San Francisco.—The Superior Court of the City of San Francisco could acquire jurisdiction of the person of a defendant by publication of a summons.

Mode op Acquiring Jurisdiction of the Person.—The form and mode of service of process by which parties defendant are brought into a Court, whether of an inferior or superior jurisdiction, are matters of legislative discretion.

Word “District,” in Twenty-fifth Section op Practice Act.—The “ District ” mentioned in the second subdivision of the twenty-fifth section of the Practice Act, which speaks of the service of summons in the district in which the action is brought, is the district or territory over which the Court exercises jurisdiction.

Idem.—The second subdivision of the twenty-fifth section of the Practice Act, requiring the defendant to appear within twenty days after the service of a summons, had no application to the Superior Court of the City of San Francisco, because its jurisdiction was confined to the County of San Francisco.

Summons out op Superior Court op San Francisco.—A summons issued out of the Superior Court of the City of San Francisco, was not defective if it omitted to notify the defendant to appear within twenty days, if served out of the county, but in the district in which the action was brought.

Kecitals in a Judgment as to Service op Process.—Upon a collateral attack, the recitals in a judgment are conclusive of the question of jurisdiction of the person, when the judgment is rendered by a Court of superior jurisdiction.

Superior Court op San Francisco.—The Superior Court of San Francisco was a Court of superior jurisdiction.

Service op Summons by Publication.—In a collateral attack on a judgment which recites the service of summons by publication, the affidavits and order showing service cannot be considered.

Presumption in Favor op Judgment.—When a judgment entered by default, upon a service of summons made by publication, recites that it was entered in pursuance of an order, the presumption is that it was entered in pursuance of an order of the Court, and the judgment is not void on its face.

By the Court, Belcher, J.: This is an action to recover the possession of an undivided fourth of a lot in the City of San Francisco. The plaintiff claims title through a judgment of the Superior Court of the City of San Francisco against one William Graff, an execution issued thereon, a sale and Sheriff’s deed. The plaintiff had judgment, and the defendant appeals.

The first point presented is that the deed from Eggelso was void as to William Graff, under the Statute of Frauds. The deed is in the ordinary form of a bargain and sale deed, and after naming the four grantees describes them as composing the firm of Graff, Fulton & Co. William Graff was a member of that firm when the deed was executed, and is named as one of the grantees. The fact that the partnership between him and the other grantees was not evidenced by written articles is immaterial. Being in fact a partner and grantee, we see nothing to prevent the deed from taking effect according to its terms, if or do we think it material in this connection that the lot was paid for with partnership funds, and was used for partnership purposes. The legal title to an undivided fourth of the lot nevertheless passed to him, incumbered only by an equitable lien in favor of the other partners.

It is next claimed that the Superior Court of the City of San Francisco was an inferior Court of special and limited jurisdiction and could not acquire jurisdiction of the person of a defendant by the publication of summons.

The Superior Court was a Court of record, having a Clerk [360]and seal and very nearly the same jurisdiction in civil cases as the District Courts. Its proceedings were regulated by the general Practice Act. Its forms and mode of proceeding were the same as in the District Courts. In Hickman v. O’Neal, 10 Cal. 292, and in Chipman v. Bowman, 14 id. 157, it was held that its process might be served in another county, and that its character as a municipal and inferior Court depended upon the subjects of its jurisdiction and its relation to other tribunals, and not upon the form of its process or the counties to which it might be issued. The statute expressly authorized the service of its summons by publication, and we know of no constitutional provision which was thereby violated. The form and mode of service of process by which parties defendant are brought into Court, whether it be an inferior or superior Court, so as to give the Court jurisdiction of their persons, are matters of legislative discretion.

McCauley v. Fulton

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