People v. Sanford (1872) · DecisionDepot

People v. Sanford

Name: California Superior Court Tentative Rulings
Creator: DecisionDepot
License: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/

California Supreme Court Jan 15, 1872 No. No. 2,916Published

Before: Crockett, Wallace

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Holding. The court held that a criminal conviction must be reversed when the trial judge provides oral instructions to the jury without the defendant's express consent, as the statute requiring written instructions is mandatory.

Issues

Whether an indictment for murder is sufficient if it does not explicitly state the time of death or that the victim died.
Whether a defendant can object to a juror's lack of property qualifications after failing to challenge them during impanelment.
Whether a non-expert witness may testify to their impression of a declarant's mental state based on personal observation.
Whether dying declarations are admissible regardless of the declarant's religious belief in a future state.

Disposition. reversed and remanded

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“The rule prescribed by the statute is mandatory and not directory”

“The cases are numerous and uniform to the point that the giving of an oral charge or instruction to the jury, in a criminal case, without the consent of the defendant, is error”

Synopsis

Appeal from the District Court of the Seventeenth Judicial District, County of Los Angeles.

The facts are stated in the opinion.

Opinion — Wallace

By the Court,

Wallace, C. J.: The defendant was convicted of the crime of murder in the second degree, committed in the felonious killing of one Enoch Barnes; and from the judgment rendered, and an [31]order of the Court denying his motion for a new trial, he prosecuted this appeal.

First—The first point made challenges the sufficiency of the indictment, which, after the usual caption, is as follows:

“ The said Cyrus Sanford is accused by the Grand Jury of the County of Los Angeles, State of California, by this indictment, found this eighth day of September, A. 1). one thousand eight hundred and seventy, of the crime of murder, committed as follows: The said Cyrus Sanford, on the fourth day of September, A. D. eighteen hundred and seventy, at the county and State aforesaid, did feloniously, willfully, maliciously, and of his malice aforethought, shoot, kill, and murder one Enoch Barnes, contrary to the form, force, and effect of the statute in such cases made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the people of the State of California."

It is "objected that “ the indictment does not state that Barnes died within a year and a day,” etc. This objection rests upon the circumstance that the time of the death is not specially stated; and if there be anything in the objection, it might have been extended further, as it is not specially stated that Barnes died at all. But the averment in substance is that he died on the fourth day of September, 1870, for it is alleged that on that day the prisoner, of his malice aforethought, did kill and murder him—and this, under the provisions of the Criminal Practice Act, is sufficient. (People v. Cronin, 34 Cal. 191.)

Second—There is nothing in the objection to the competency of the juror. It was the duty of the defendant' in the first place to have examined him as to his competency in the respect referred to at the time the jury was impaneled. He does not seem to have made any objection to his competency even afterwards, but took his trial before him with a knowledge of the fact that his name was on the [32]

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Fourth—The next point relied upon concerns the admissibility of the evidence given by Burns, the Sheriff, by whom the prosecution were permitted to prove certain dying declarations of the deceased. The witness was asked by the prosecution to state the condition of mind of the deceased at the time—whether it was clear or confused. This was objected to by the defense, because the witness was not a medical man, etc.; but the objection was overruled, and the witness answered in substance, that judging from the conversation of the deceased at the time, his mind was clear. It is said here, for the prisoner, that this was the expression of a mere opinion, by a non-expert witness, and should have been excluded on that ground. We do not think so. We understand the rule on this point to be that a witness, even though not an expert, who details a conversation had between himself and another, may also, in connection therewith, state his'opinion, belief, or impression as to the state of the mind of such person, as these seemed or appeared to [33]the witness at the time of the conversation. The impression made upon the mind of Bums, to the effect that the mental condition of the deceased was unobstructed, was an impression he had formed by personal observation. He had heard the utterances of the deceased; these he could repeat, or substantially repeat, to the jury; but he had also - observed his tone, gesture, appearance, and his general demeanor at the time; these he could not be expected to reproduce to the jury as he saw and observed them; nor could he even describe them in giving his evidence, without in some degree indicating his own opinion or impression of what they were—and this, it is said, he may not be permitted to do. We think, however, that this cannot be said to be an expression of the mere opinion of the witness in the objectionable sense. In the language of Judge Gaston: “It approaches to knowledge, and is knowledge, so far as the imperfection of human nature will permit knowledge of these things to be acquired; and the result thus acquired should be communicated to the jury, because they have not had the opportunities of personal observation, and because in no other way can they effectually have the benefit of the knowledge gained by the observations of others.” (2 Ired. 78.)

Concurrence — Crockett

Crockett, J., concurring specially:

I concur in the opinion of the Chief Justice, except in so far as it holds that in this State dying declarations are admissible in evidence, even though it affirmatively appears that the dying person had no religious faith whatever, or any sense of future accountability. If it be conceded that his opinion in matters of religious faith, or his belief as to a state of future accountability, do not affect the competency of a witness testifying under oath, it by no means results that the same rule is applicable to dying declarations. The law has provided proper penalties for perjury, which are supposed to afford a sufficient guaranty that persons testifying under oath will speak the truth; and the only ground on which dying declarations are admitted in evidence is, that a [37]person who is about to die and is conscious of that fact, has at least as strong a motive to speak the truth as a witness testifying under oath, who may be visited with a prosecution for perjury if he testifies falsely. But a dying person who is wholly devoid of religious faith and who does not believe in a state of future accountability, has no other motive to speak the truth than his mere abstract sense of right and wrong. If he believes that he is in no danger of punishment, either in this world or the next, if his declarations should he willfully false, there would be nothing left but a mere abstract sense of right and wrong compelling him to speak the truth. If this alone be sufficient to justify the admission of his declarations, there is no reason why the same rule should not be applied to a witness in good health. If I correctly understand the reason of this rule which admits dying declarations in evidence, it is that in the solemn hour of death a dying person, who is about to enter upon a future state of existence in which he is to he, in some manner, held accountable for his acts in this life, has at least as strong a motive to speak the truth as if he were acting under oath, and for this reason the oath is dispensed with. But there would be no such motive if he did not believe in a future state.

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Synopsis

Opinion — Wallace

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Concurrence — Crockett

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