Logan v. Hale
Before: Crockett
Synopsis
Subrogation or Judgment Debtor to Interest or Judgment Debt- or in Land.—If A. makes a verbal contract with B. to sell him a tract of land, and puts B. in possession thereof, judgment creditors of B. do not thereby, by virtue of the lien of their j udgment or the levy of an execution, acquire such an interest in the land as to entitle them to be subrogated to B.’s rights, and to compel A. to make a conveyance to them upon paying him the purchase price which B. was to pay.
Lien or Judgment Creditor.—If A. makes a verbal contract with B. to sell him a tract of land, and B. goes into possession, B.’s judgment creditors acquire no interest in the land except a lien on his interest to he enforced by sale on execution.
Parties to Suit in Equity.—If A. makes a verbal contract with B. to sell him a tract of land, and puts him in possession, B. is a necessary party to an action commenced by the judgment creditors against A. to be subrogated to B.’s rights in the land.
The Court Must Supply Omissions in Findings.—If the findings of a Court omit material facts in the cause, it is the duty of the Court to supply the omissions when its attention is called to the subject by proper exceptions to the findings.
Levy Upon Land, when Irregular.—When the judgment debtor has, or claims, an interest in only a small, well defined parcel of a much larger tract of land, it is extremely irregular, to say the least, to levy the execution upon his interest in the general tract instead of the particular parcel he claims.
Enjoining Sale on Execution.—If the owner of a large tract of land contracts to sell a part of it, and the judgment creditors of the party with whom he contracts attempt to sell the whole tract on execution, the Court intimates that the owner may enjoin the sale, except as to the part contracted to be sold.
By the Court, Crockett, J.: Waiving the question whether the levy of the defendants’ attachment and execution, and the threatened sale under the execution, created a cloud upon the plaintiff’s title, and whether the plaintiff had such a possession of the land sold [649]to Robinson as would enable Mm to maintain an action to quiet bis title under section two hundred and fifty-four of the code, I proceed to inquire whether the defendants are entitled to the relief awarded to them by the Court below. Allowing to the pretensions of the defendants Levensohn and Galland the widest latitude, the utmost that they can rightfully claim on the facts disclosed by the record is that, by reason of their judgment, attachment, and execution, they have acquired a lien, for the security of their debt, upon whatever interest Robinson had in the land purchased from the plaintiff. But I am unable to discover on what possible theory of the facts contained in the record the Court arrived at the conclusion that the execution creditors were entitled to a conveyance of the land from the plaintiff. The levy of their execution did not entitle them to be subrogated to all of Robinson’s rights, but only to a lien on his interest in the land, to be enforced by a sale under the execution. Robinson was not a party to the action, and is not bound by the judgment. If the plaintiff should submit to the judgment, and convey the land, as he is ordered to do, to the execution creditors, the judgment would be no bar to a subsequent action by Robinson, against the plaintiff, to compel a conveyance. Moreover, the land may be worth four times the amount of the judgment, and it may be that, under the parol agreement for a rescission of the contract between Robinson and the plaintiff the latter would be entitled to the surplus proceeds of the sale, even though it be conceded that Robinson had an interest in the land which is subject to the execution. In any view of the case, that portion of the judgment is erroneous which directs the plaintiff to convey the land to the judgment creditors.
The Court also erred in refusing to amend its findings on the request of the plaintiff. The findings, as filed, omitted [650]to find upon several offthe material issues in the cause, and the Court should have supplied the omission when its attention was called to the subject by the plaintiff’s exceptions to the findings.
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