Talbert v. Hopper
Before: Sprague
Synopsis
Judicial IToticb or Terms or District Courts.—The Supreme Court will take judicial notice of the regular terms of the District Courts as fixed by statute, and also of the fact that they are authorized by statute (Stats. 1863-4, p. 118). to adjourn any general term in one county within their districts to a day certain within the time prescribed for the commencement of the next term in the same county, provided such special term shall not interfere with any general term in such district.
Adjourned Term oe District Court.—Where the general February Term of the Sixth District Court for Sacramento County must have commenced on February first and concluded prior to March fifteenth; and the general March Term of the same Court for Tolo County must have commenced on March fifteenth and concluded prior to April fifth; held, that under and by compliance with the Act of 1864, providing for adjourned terms' (Stats. 1863-4, p. 118), such Court could hold a legal session in Sacramento County after March fifteenth, and up to April fifth.
Presumption in Favor oe Legality oe 'Sessions oe District Court.— Where it appeared from a record on appeal from a District Court for a certain county that the trial took place on a day subsequent to the regular general term in such county; held, that as by compliance with the statute of 1864, relative to adjourned terms (Stats. 1863-4, p. 118), such Court could be legally held at such time, it would be presumed, in the absence of any showing to the contrary, that it was legally held.
Vesting oe Title under Deed upon Condition Precedent.—The instrument executed by John A. Sutter, Jr., to Brannan, Bruce, Graham, and Wetzlar, on June 20th, 1860, in reference to Sacramento and other property, was a deed upon condition precedent; and upon the performance of that condition, which was the payment of the purchase money, the title to the lands described vested in grantees.
Ejectment Founded upon Title.—Where a plaintiff relies upon title as the basis of his right to recover possession, and fails to establish his title, judgment is properly rendered against him.
By the Court, Sprague, J.: On the reopening of the original submission of this cause, appellant made and now urges the point that on the 18th day of March, 1869, and on the succeeding days, which by [400]the record is shown to have been the time when the cause was tried, the Sixth Judicial District Court for the County of Sacramento could have had no legal existence, except upon special conditions, and that the record in the case failing to show affirmatively the existence of these prerequisite conditions the trial is a nullity. This Court will take judicial notice of the regular terms of the District Courts, as fixed by statute, and also of the fact that by statute the several District Courts of the State are authorized to adjourn any general term of their Court in one county composing their district to a day certain within the time prescribed by law for the commencement of the next term for such county; provided such special term shall not interfere with a general term in such district. (Stats. 1863-4, p. 118.) The general terms of the District Court for Sacramento County are fixed by law to commence on the first Mondays of February, April, June, August, October, and December of each year; and for Yolo County, the only other county composing the Sixth Judicial District, on the third Mondays of March, July, and November of each year. The general February Terms of the Sixth District Court for Sacramento County must, therefore, be held commencing on the first Monday of February, and concluded before the third Monday of March in each year; and for the year 1869 such general term must have commenced on the first day of February, and have concluded at some time prior to the fifteenth day of March; and the general March Term of said Court for Yolo County must have commenced on the fifteenth day of March, and have concluded at some time prior to the first Monday or fifth day of April, the day fixed by law for the commencement of the general April Term for Sacramento County.
By the Act of March 1st, 1864, above referred to, it is provided as follows: “It shall be lawful for the District Court sitting in any county of this State, by an order [401]entered on its minutes, to adjourn the Court- to a day certain within the time fixed by law for the commencement of the next term in such county, notwithstanding a term or terms for some other county within the same district may intervene; provided that such special term shall not interfere with any general term in said district.”
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