Stoppelkamp v. Mangeot

California Supreme Court Oct 15, 1871 No. No. 1,682Published

Before: Sawyer, Wallace

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Holding. The court held that a landlord cannot unilaterally increase rent under the Forcible Entry and Detainer Act of 1863 for a tenant holding over under a lease for a specific term of one month, as the statutory notice provisions only apply to tenancies from month to month. Consequently, the judgment for treble rent was reversed and the case remanded for a new trial.

Issues

Whether a lease for a specific term of one month constitutes a tenancy from month to month under the Forcible Entry and Detainer Act of 1863.
Whether a landlord may unilaterally change the terms of a lease for a specific term by providing notice before the expiration of that term.
Whether the judgment for treble rent was supported by the facts alleged in the complaint.

Disposition. reversed and remanded

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“The statute only authorizes a change of the terms of the lease in the mode pursued in the case of a tenancy from month to month. It was not authorized, therefore, in the case alleged in this complaint.”

“The judgment, as we have seen, gives relief to which the plaintiff is not entitled upon the facts alleged in the complaint, and the judgment must be reversed”

Synopsis

Changing Terms of Lease by Landlord.—The mode of changing the terms of a lease upon notice by the landlord, depends wholly upon the statute; and the cases in which such changes can be made are limited to those in which it is expressly authorized.

Estates by Lease—Time Specified, and Time Indefinite.—A lease for a specified period of time, as for one month, creates an estate substantially different from that created by a lease for an indefinite period, with rent payable monthly, or by a lease from month to month. Where the time is specified, the lease terminates by the mere lapse of time. No notice is necessary to entitle the landlord to reenter, or to enable him to recover possession. But where the lease is from month to month, the lease does not terminate by the mere lapse of time—neither party can terminate the relation without notice to the other in advance.

Tenancy for Tears, and from Tear to Tear.—If a tenant for years holds over with the consent of his landlord, express or implied, paying yearly rent, without any further arrangement as to time, the tenancy may thus be converted into a tenancy from year to year.

Tenancy for Tears.—A tenancy for the specified period of one month is a tenancy for years, and not a tenancy from year to year, or from month to month.

Tenancy from Month to Month.—A tenant for the specified period of one month, who holds over with the consent of his landlord, thereby becomes a tenant from month to month.

Idem—Bepudiated by act of Landlord.—S. sued M., alleging that he had leased certain lots to M. for one month, for twenty-five dollars; that fifteen days before the close of the month he gave notice, in writing, under the Forcible Entry and Detainer Act of 1863, that the rent for the next month would be five hundred dollars, payable in advance; that M. had held over, and had failed to pay the rent; held, that by giving the notice of a change of terms before a tenancy from month to month commenced, and following it up by a demand of rent, and immediately thereafter of possession, he repudiated the holding over on the original terms, and the claims of the parties were adverse, and actually hostile, from the moment of the expiration of the specific terms alleged, and there never was a tenancy from month to month.

Constitutionality of Statute as to Jurisdiction of County Court.— The provisions of the statute conferring jurisdiction upon County Courts in actions to recover the possession of premises held over by tenants against the consent of the landlord, are constitutional.

Query.—Whether the provisions of the sixth section of the Forcible Entry and Detainer Act of 1863, as to changing terms of lease by notice from the landlord in the mode therein prescribed, are constitutional?

By the Court, Sawyer, C. J.: This is an action against a tenant holding over, to recover the premises under the Forcible Entry and Detainer Act of 1863. The complaint alleges that plaintiff, on the 20th of June, 1867, “leased, demised, and let to said defendant” the premises in question, “to have and to hold the said premises to said defendant, Charles Mangeot, for the month thence ensuing, at the rent of twenty-five dollars, payable on the twentieth day of said month of June, in advance. That by virtue of said lease, the said defendant, Charles Mangeot, went into the possession and occupation of the demised premises, and still continues to hold and occupy the same.” The complaint then alleges the giving of notice in time, under section six of said Act, that if defendant should hold over after the expiration of the month, the rent would be five hundred dollars per month, in gold coin, a demand and refusal of the rent, and a demand of the possession. The case was tried by a referee; the facts found in favor of plaintiff' and judgment rendered for possession and treble rent, at five hundred dollars per month.

The first point is, that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action or to sustain the judgment, in this, that the tenancy alleged is a tenancy for [322]a specific time, viz: one month, and not a tenancy from month to month, and is, therefore, not within the provisions of the sixth section, authorizing a change of the term of the lien by giving notice in the mode therein prescribed. The provisions of the sixth section are as follows: “In all leases of lands or tenements, or any interest therein, from month to month, the landlord may, and it shall be lawful for him, upon giving notice in" writing at least fifteen days before the expiration of the month, to change the terms of the lease, to take effect at the expiration of said month. Said notice, when served upon the tenant, shall of itself operate and be effectual to create and establish, as a part of the lien, the terms, rent, and conditions specified in said notice, if such tenant shall continue to hold such premises after the expiration of said month.”

Without this provision of the statute, of course, the landlord could not change the terms of the lease in the mode prescribed. This mode of changing the terms of the lease, and creating a new contract against the will of the tenant, then depends wholly upon the statute, and the cases in which such changes can be made must be limited to those in which it is expressly authorized. We cannot extend the stringent provisions of the Act to other cases not provided for. Unless a lease for a specific period of time, as one month, is the same identical thing in law as a lease for an indefinite period of time with rent payable monthly, or a lease from month to month, the provisions of section six do not apply to the former. And they are clearly not identical in law. They are different estates, with different incidents, and are designated in law by different technical terms. There is a substantial, not merely a verbal difference. On a lease for a specific time, as one month, the estate terminates by the mere lapse of time, and at the end of the term the lessee must go out. Eo notice is necessary to terminate the tenancy and entitle the landlord to reenter, or to enable the

Stoppelkamp v. Mangeot

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