Goodyear v. Williston
Before: Sprague
Synopsis
Seizure by Sheriee, at direction oe Judgment Creditor, when Joint Trespass.—Where a Sheriff, under an execution against McGrane, and at the direction of the judgment creditor Williston, seized upon certain property, including wheat and barley, in possession of Goodyear, who had purchased in good faith and for value of McGrane after the crop was cut and stacked; and, at the same time, the Sheriff, having in his hands a mortgage given by McGrane to Williston upon the crop while growing, took possession of the wheat and barley also under such mortgage, and placed all the property seized in possession of Casey, as his keeper, as agent of Williston: held, that these facts established a joint taking by the Sheriff and judgment creditor, which, if wrongful, would sustain an action against them jointly as trespassers.
Mortgage on Growing Crop.—The intent of the provision relating to mortgages of growing crops, in section seventeen of the Statute of Frauds (Stats. 1856, p. 87), was to protect the lien of such a mortgage, without any delivery of possession, until the crop was so far harvested as to be capable of manual delivery and transportation; but the continuance of such lien afterwards, as against a subsequent purchaser in good faith, depends upon actual delivery of the crop to the mortgagee, and his retention of the possession thereof.
Purchase in Stacks ot Grain Mortgaged while Growing.—Where a mortgage was given upon growing crops of wheat and barley, as provided in section seventeen of the Statute of Frauds (Stats. 1856, p. 87), and after they were cut and put into stacks and shocks the mortgagor sold and delivered them to a purchaser in good faith, and for value: held, that the lien of the mortgage, without possession in the mortgagee, extended only to a severance of the crops from the land, and that the purchaser took them relieved of the mortgage lien.
By the Court, Sprague, J.: This is an appeal from the judgment, upon the judgment roll alone, by the defendants, who contend that the findings do not sustain the judgment. It is claimed that the findings show that the defendants were not jointly interested in the personal property sought to be recovered by plaintiff, and that they did not take joint possession of such property, or any portion thereof; hence no joint judgment could be properly entered against them. The findings show that defendant Hobbs, as Sheriff of Solano County, by virtue of an execution in his hands in favor of Williston and Brown-lee, and against McGraue, on or about the 15th day of August, 1870, “ under the direction of said Williston, entered upon and attached the property described in the complaint; * * * that at the time of the entry of the Sheriff on said tract he had the mortgage in his possession, and with said attachment [execution], and under said mortgage, he attempted to and did take possession of all said wheat and barley, and the other property described in the complaint, and left the same in the possession of one Casey, as his keeper and also as agent of said defendant Williston, and then took the property in the complaint described, and detained and still detains the same from the plaintiff".” These facts establish a joint taking and detention by the defendants, which, if wrongful, clearly sustain a judgment against them jointly, as trespassers, whether Williston assumed to act as mortgagee of a portion of the property, or as joint judg[16]ment creditor with Brownlee. The defendant Hobbs was clearly a trespasser, upon the facts as found; as no portion of the property was at the time subject to execution as the property of McGrane; and Williston, in directing the levy, was a joint trespasser with him as to all the property except the wheat and barley. As to the wheat and barley, it is claimed that Williston was justified in taking possession thereof, under his mortgage of the growing crop, of April 29th, 1870. The validity of this claim involves the construction of the seventeenth section of the Act of May 19th, 1850, “concerning fraudulent conveyances and contracts,” as amended April 9th, 1856, which section, as amended, reads as follows:
“Sec. 17. Ho mortgage of personal property hereafter made shall be valid against any other person than the parties thereto, unless possession of the mortgaged property be delivered to and retained by the mortgagee; provided, that a mortgage upon growing crops, executed, acknowledged, and recorded like mortgages upon real estate, shall be valid as against third parties without such delivery of possession; but the lien of such mortgage shall cease as against subsequent purchasers unless possession of such crops, when harvested, be delivered to the mortgagee, as required in other eases of mortgage of personal property.” (Stats. 1856, p. 87.)
More from California Supreme Court
- People v. Wende (1979)
- People v. Watson (1956)
- People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996)
- People v. Kelly (2006)
- Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962)
- Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001)
- People v. Lewis (2021)
- In Re Estrada (1965)
- Denham v. Superior Court (1970)
- People v. Marsden (1970)