Meley v. Collins
Before: Rhodes
Synopsis
Delay to Attack Forged Deed- as Estoppel.—In an action to recover possession of land held by an innocent purchaser who deraigns title through a forged deed which has been of record five years with knowledge of the plaintiff, the delay of the plaintiff to attack the forged deed is not material if it be not relied upon as extinguishing the plaintiff’s title by the operation of the statute of limitations; and such delay does not estop the plaintiff to say that the alleged deed is not his deed.
Obligation op Owner as to Hostile Title.—The owner of property is justified in relying upon his title, and he is under' no obligations to proceed against all persons who may assert a hostile title, although another person might be deceived by the apparent genuineness of such hostile title.
Obligation op Owner as to Forged Deed.—It is not the duty of the owner of real estate, if his own interests do not require it, to attack a forged deed to his property.
Protection to Purchaser under Forged Deed.—A purchaser may protect himself from injury resulting from a forged deed by exacting the necessary covenants from the vendor.
By the Court, Rhodes, C. J.: In June, 1859, the plaintiff was the owner of the premises in controversy. The defendant Collins produced a deed of the premises, dated June 4th, 1859, and recorded the same month, which purported to have been executed by the plaintiff to one James A. Gilbert, and proved by a subscrib[676]ing witness. He also produced a deed of the premises from Gilbert to McKenzie, dated October 16th, 1865; and a deed from McKenzie to the defendant Collins, dated April 28th, 1866—and proved that the latter paid the purchase money. The plaintiff’s evidence tended to show that the deed from her to Gilbert was a forgery; and it was shown that some time after the date of the deed, but prior to 1861, she learned of its existence, and ascertained that it had been recorded. The defendant’s evidence tended to prove that Collins, at the time of his purchase, had no knowledge that the plaintiff claimed that the deed from her to Gilbert was a forgery. This action was commenced in 1867.
The question presented for decision arises on the instructions. The Court laid down this rule of law: That if the plaintiff became aware that the alleged deed from her to Gilbert was of record within about one year from the time it was recorded; and if Gilbert returned to this State in 1861 and boarded with her for a time; and if during that time she was aware of the existence and recordation of that deed; and if she took no steps to have the deed set aside and annulled, then, if the defendant Collins, in 1866, purchased the property for a valuable consideration, relying upon the genuineness of the purported deed from the plaintiff to Gilbert, without any knowledge that she claimed that the deed had been forged, the defendant is entitled to recover. The reason assigned is, that as she took no steps to have the deed annulled, she thereby permitted the parties claiming under it to deal with the property as their own; and that as the defendant purchased the property under these circumstances, the plaintiff is estopped to say that the alleged deed is not her deed.
It will be assumed, for the purposes of the argument, that the deed is a forgery. The circumstance that, during a portion of the time, Gibert was within, and during another portion of the time was without, the State, may be dis[677]
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