Mayor and Common Council of San Jose v. Trimble

California Supreme Court Jul 1, 1871 No. No. 2,403Published

Before: Crockett, Rhodes

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Holding. The court held that the statute of limitations under the Act of 1863 requires an adverse possession to be continuous for five years to bar an action for recovery of land, and that the defendant's possession was insufficient because it was interrupted by a third party.

Issues

Whether the Act of 1863 bars an action for the recovery of land derived from Spanish or Mexican grants if the defendant has held adverse possession for five years.
Whether an interruption in the defendant's adverse possession breaks the continuity required by the statute of limitations.

Disposition. affirmed

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“If interrupted, even by force or fraud, and the possession be recovered by a peaceable or forcible entry, or by process of law, nevertheless the continuity of the possession was broken”

Synopsis

Mexican Grant, including Private Claim.—A Mexican grant was confirmed by the United States, excepting certain tracts included within its exterior boundaries, granted to private claimants. Land claimed as part of a tract thus excepted was excluded by an official survey of the tract; held, that the land thus excluded is a portion of the land confirmed in the larger grant.

Construction of Statute—Limitation to Becovery under Mexican Grant.—An actual adverse possession of five years subsequent to the passage of the Act of 1863, relative to Spanish and Mexican grants, will, in certain cases, bar a recovery under a title derived from Spain or Mexico, even though the title was not confirmed until after the expiration of the five years.

Adverse Possession as Bar to Becovery.—Adverse possession, in order to bar a recovery by the true owner* must have continued, without interruption, during the statutory period. If interrupted, even by force or fraud, and the possession be recovered by a peaceable or forcible entry, or by process of law, the continuity is broken, and the statute begins to run only from the time of the reentry.

By the Court, Crockett, J.: The action is ejectment, and the plaintiffs are clearly entitled to recover, unless the defendant has established a valid defense under the statute of limitations. The plaintiffs claim under a final decree of the Supreme Court of. the United States, rendered in J une, 1866, confirming to them a large tract, which includes the premises in controversy; but on the face of this decree there is excepted from its operation certain tracts granted by the Spanish or Mexican Governments to private claimants; and of these excepted tracts the “Rancho Milpitas” was one. This tract was granted by the Mexican Government to one Alviso, whose title was confirmed by* a final decree of the proper tribunal of the United States prior to the year 1863; and an official survey thereof was made by one Thompson, a Deputy United States Surveyor, which survey included the premises in controversy as a part of said rancho. But in September, 1863, this survey was set aside by competent authority and a new survey ordered, which was accordingly made and became final in December, 1868. This survey excluded the premises in con[540]troversy from the Milpitas Rancho; and it results, as a necessary conclusion from these facts, that said premises are a portion of the lands finally confirmed to the plaintiffs by the decree of June, 1866.

But it appears in the case that as early as 1851, Alviso, claiming to be the owner of said premises as a portion of the Rancho Milpitas, sold and conveyed them; and the defendant deraigns title under this conveyance. It further appears that the defendant and his predecessors entered under this title, and had the actual and undisturbed possession from 1851 to 1863, in which last named year the defendant was forcibly evicted from the whole tract, or the greater portion thereof, by one Ogan, who had the actual possession until the early part of the year 1866, when the defendant regained the possession by process of law, and has ever since remained and is yet in possession. The present action was commenced in October, 1868, and .the defense chiefly relied upon is the statute of limitations.

The title of the plaintiffs is derived from the Spanish and Mexican Governments, and under the amendment of 1855 to the statute of limitations, it is quite plain that if that amendment had remained in force the statute would not have commenced to run against the plaintiffs until after their claim was finally confirmed and had been located by a final, approved survey. But in 1863 the statute was again amended and materially modified, in respect, to actions or defenses founded on titles derived from Spain or Mexico. The sixth section of the amendatory Act, after providing that time which had already run under the existing law, should be taken and computed as a part of the time limited in.said amendatory Act, for the commencement of an action or making a defense thereto, proceeds as follows:

Mayor and Common Council of San Jose v. Trimble

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