Reed v. Bernal

California Supreme Court Jan 15, 1871 No. No. 2,388Published

Before: Cbookett

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Holding. The court held that an appellant cannot challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support a judgment without first moving for a new trial, and that a justice court judgment including a penalty fee exceeding the jurisdictional limit is void.

Issues

Whether an appellant may challenge the sufficiency of evidence to support a judgment without a motion for a new trial.
Whether a justice court judgment including a penalty fee that pushes the total amount over the jurisdictional limit is void.

Disposition. reversed

Synopsis

Appeal from the District Court of the Third- District, County of Santa Clara,

There #.re two propositions to which we invite the attention of the Court, either of which we respectfully submit is sufficient to defeat plaintiff’s action:

First — That tbe assumed or pretended judgment upon which this action was brought is in excess of the -amount for which a Justice of the Peace is authorized to render judgment; it exceeds that amount (exclusive of interest and cost) by tbe sum of $36.50,

The Justice of the Peace undertook to render a judgment for the sum of $422.98, principal and interest, due upon a contract for the payment of money; $125 thereof being principal; and for the further sum of $211.49 upon a special contract contained in the instrument or obligation sued on and for costs of suit.

That the Justice of the Peace had no power to render such judgment there can be no doubt. The jurisdiction of a Justice of the Peace is clearly defined and limited by statute. (See 1 yol. Hittell’s Digest, 1279, Sec. 48, 1 and 7 subdivisions.)

The parties, by their agreement or contract, could not extend the jurisdiction of the Justice beyond that conferred by the statute; and the Justice of the Peace in attempting to accommodate his proceedings to the stipulations contained in the contract of the parties transcended his jurisdictional limits and his judgment is therefore void. (Chapman y. Morgan, 2 Green. (Iowa), 874; .Fellet v. Engler, 8 Gal. 76.)

No motion for a new trial was made in the Court below. The case comes to this Court on a statement of the testimony on an appeal from the judgment alone, and this Court will not review the testimony upon such appeal. Whether the evidence is sufficient to support the judgment or not, is a question this Court will not inquire into on this appeal. (Cogliards v. Hoberlin, 18 Cal. 394.)

The judgment roll shows no error, nor does the record show that any error of law was committed by the Court below on the trial.

Questions of law only are sought to be reviewed on this appeal; the record contains a full statement of the facts and all the evidence. It has been so often held by this Court that a motion for new trial in such case was unnecessary and not the proper method to be adopted in order to have the proceedings of the Court below reviewed, that we deem it unnecessary to enumerate authorities upon tbe point, a few of which, however, are Weatherhead v. Carroll, (38 Cal. 549); Harper v. Minor, (27 Cal. 107); Treadwell v. Davis, (34 Cal. 601),

We think we have shown that the so-called judgment of the Justice upon which respondent’s action is brought is absolutely void, the testimony clearly demonstrates the proposition when tested by the authorities cited in our opening brief.

Cbookett, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, Temple, J., and Rhodes, C. J., concurring:

The plaintiff having recovered in the Court below, the defendants omitted to move for a new trial, but appealed from the judgment, and have brought up the evidence in a statement on appeal which assigns as errors certain rulings of the Court in respect to the admission of evidence; and also, that giving full effect to the evidence, the judgment should have been for the defendants. There appears to have been no contest as to the facts, the evidence of which was wholly record and documentary. The plaintiff claims that without a motion for a new trial this Court cannot review the evidence in order to ascertain whether the proper judgment was rendered upon the facts proved, even though there was no controversy as to the facts. But in the case of Treadwell v. Davis, (34 Cal. 601), this Court held to the contrary, and if that decision be accepted as a correct exposition of the law on this point it will be decisive against the plaintiff. Since that decision was rendered, and upon more mature reflection, and after a careful review of the authorities, I am satisfied the proposition announced in that case on this point is not tenable. When a party complains that the evidence was insufficient to justify the verdict, or decision, the appropriate remedy is by a motion for a new trial; and, in pursuing this remedy, the statute requires him to specify in his statement in support of the motion the particulars in which the evidence was insufficient. In this method the attention of the Court and counsel is particu[631]larly directed to the precise point in which the evidence is alleged to be insufficient; so that on the trial of the motion the Court may review the evidence and exercise its judgment and discretion, either by upholding or setting aside the verdict or decision. It is conceded on all sides that if there be any evidence whatever tending to support the verdict or decision, its sufficiency can only be determined, and the evidence reviewed for that purpose, on amotion for a new trial; and we have repeatedly held, that if there be a substantial conflict in the evidence, this Court will not disturb the verdict or findings. It is equally well settled that if there be no findings in a cause tried by the Court, without a jury, and no proper exception for want of findings, a presumption arises that the Court found all the facts necessary to support the judgment. If there be no actual findings, the law implies findings sufficient to sustain the judgment. In all cases, therefore, whether there be a verdict or written findings, or only the findings which the law implies in support of the judgment, if it be claimed that there was no evidence whatever to support the judgment, this is only another mode of saying that the evidence was insufficient too justify the verdict, or findings, as the case may be. If the verdict or written findings support the judgment, it is too plain to admit of discussion that, so long as the verdict or written findings remain undisturbed, the judgment cannot be assailed on the ground that it is not justified by the evidence. Before the judgment can be attacked on this ground, the verdict or findings must be set aside, because not justified by the evidence; and this can only be done on a motion for a new trial. In other words, the attack must be, not upon the judgment directly, but upon the verdict or findings which support the judgment; and if the former be set aside, the latter will fall for want of support. No one, I apprehend, will question the correctness of this proposition, as applied to a judgment supported by a verdict or written findings. But in a cause tried by the Courtj if there be no written findings, nor any exception for the want of them, the law, as we have seen, will imply findings suffi

Reed v. Bernal

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