Broad v. Broad
Before: Bhodes
Synopsis
Appeal from the Fifteenth District Court, City and County of San Francisco.
Action for a partition of the premises in controversy, and for the rents, issues and profits for the ten years next preceding.
Judgment was for defendant, and plaintiffs appealed.
The other facts are stated in the opinion-
On the death of plaintiffs’ mother, one hall of the premises went to them, as tenants in common with defendant. (Act April 17th, 1850, p. 254, defining rights of husband and wife, Secs. 9, 11, 12 ; Hittell’s Dig., Secs. 3571, 3573, 3574 ; Panaudv. Jones, 1 Cal. 512 ; Beard v. Knox, 5 Cal. 252; Estate of Buchanan, 8 Cal. 507; Smith v„ Sirvith, 12 Cal. 226; Packard v. Arrellanes, 17 Cal. 536; 0«f v. Be la Guerra, 18 Cal. 74 ; Hart v.Robertson, 21 Cal. 348; Morrison v. Bowman, 29 Cal. 337 ; Jewell v. Jewell, 28 Cal. 235; McLeron v. Benton, 31 Cal. 32 ; Civil Code of Louisiana, Arts. 2373, 2376, 2378; Guillotte v. City of Lafayette, 5 La. Ann.It. pp. 381, 382 ; Broussard v. Bernard, 4 La. 140, YU O. S. 217 ; German v. Gay, 5 La. 361, IX O. S. 580 ; Gale v. Davis’ Heirs, 2 Martin, 307, 4 Martin, O. S. 651; Pettrie v. Wofford, 3 La. Ann. 561; Duncan v. Bawle, 16 Tex. 478.)
Tbe complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. In partition, plaintiffs must set forth fully and particularly the origin, nature, and extent of their interest in the property. (Prac. Act, Sec. 255,270; Morenhaut v. Higuera, 32 Cal. 295; Bradley v. Harhness, 26 Cal. 77; Dye v. Dye, 11 Cal. 163.)
Prom the facts as found, it will appear that the title did not pass from the Mexican Government before the conquest, nor from the Government of the United States during the lifetime of Mrs. Broad. Therefore, when it passed it inured to Broad, respondent.
The deed from Pool to respondent was a quitclaim deed of the possession only. It could convey no more. Respondent was not estopped by that deed from setting up an after acquired title from the Government, either by the Yan Ness Ordinance, or by the Acts of Congress. (Gar-pentierv. Thurston, 24 Cal. 268; Valentine v. Mahoney, April, 1869 ;BrooJcsv. Hyde, April, 1869; Holden v. Andrews, April, 1869; Johnson v. Johnson, 11 Cal. 205; Lawson and Wife v. Bipley, 17 La. 238. 251; Barbel v. Langlois, 5 La. An. 212; Succession of Morgan, 12 La. An. 153; Fuller v. Ferguson, 26 Cal. 562; 2 Smith’s Lead Cas., side 624-5; 2 Smith’s Lead Gas., top 775-6; Sparrow v. Kingman, 1 N. Y. 242; Bigelow v. Finch, 11 Barb. 498.)
The title was, at the time of the death of Mrs- Broad, in the United States; the grant of the American Alcalde was but a license to occupy, and did not ripen into title until tbe Acts of Congress. (Townsend v. Greeley, 5 Wallace, 336; Valentine v. Mahoney, 37 Cal. 389; McLearen v. Benton Oct. 1869, not reported; Brooks v. Hyde, 37 Cal. 366.)
Bhodes, C. J., delivered tbe opinion of tbe Court, Temple, J., Wallace, J., and Crockett, J., concurring:
Tbe premises in controversy, are a portion of a lot in San Francisco, which was granted by tbe Alcalde to a person named in tbe grant. Sucb title to tbe premises in controversy, as bad passed by tbe Alcalde’s grant, vested in tbe defendant and bis wife, in 1852, as community property. Tbe wife died in 1858. Tbe plaintiffs are her children. They claim tbat they, together with their father — the defendant— are tenants in common of tbe premises ; tbat each of tbe plaintiffs bold tbe title to tbe undivided fourth, and tbe defendant tbe title to tbe undivided half of tbe premises.
If tbe complaint fails to sufficiently state tbe origin, nature or-extent of tbe interests of tbe plaintiffs, tbe objection should have been presented by demurrer. If not taken in tbat mode it is waived.
[496]That an Alcalde’s grant passed a title to tbe grantee therein named, is beyond controversy in this Court. Whatever may have been the effect of the Yan Ness ordinance and its confirmation by the statute of this State, or the Act of Congress, as to a lot that had been granted by an Al-calde — whether they operated as a transfer of title, or merely as a release — it is clear that all the tenants in com- ' mon received its benefits.
The main question in the case, as both parties consider it, is whether, upon the death of the defendant’s wife, one half of'the property vested in the plaintiffs. The eleventh section of the Act of 1850, defining the rights of husband and wife —which was in force at the death of the wife of the defendant — is as follows: “ Upon the dissolution of the community by the death of either husband or wife, one half of the common property shall go to the survivor, and the other half to the descendants of the deceased husband or wife, subject to the payment of the debts of the deceased. If there be no descendants of the deceased husband or wife, the whole shall go to the survivor, subject to such payment.” There is no room for construction, so far as this, question is concerned, except as to the meaning of the words “ shall go.” As related to the survivor of the community, there can be no doubt that those words mean “ shall vest.” The survivor takes one half of such title as the community held. The same words are necessarily implied in the clause of the section, which speaks of the acquisition of title by the descendants of the deceased husband or wife — that is to say, ‘£ the other half [shall go] to the descendants of the deceased husband or wife.” Those words have the same signification in each instance ; and there is nothing in the language of the Act, which would tend to assign them a meaning in the one case, different from that given in the other. They take title of the same nature, and to the same extent, as that which vests in the survivor.
More from California Supreme Court
- People v. Wende (1979)
- People v. Watson (1956)
- People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996)
- People v. Kelly (2006)
- Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962)
- Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001)
- People v. Lewis (2021)
- In Re Estrada (1965)
- Denham v. Superior Court (1970)
- People v. Marsden (1970)