Packard v. Bird
Before: Expressed, Rhodes, Temple
Synopsis
Appeal from tbe District -Court of the Third District, Santa Clara County.
Action to compel execution of a deed.
In 1864 Bird sold land to Chapman, received his money, bat gave a bond for a deed at Chapman’s request. Cottle attached the land then in Bird’s possession, as the property of Chapman. Bird .answered it was Chapman’s property, but that $750 was due therein. Subsequently admitting he had been paid, Cottle had an execution issued and a sale toot place, Cottle buying in, and subsequently assigning to Packard the respondent, who received a deed and possession, and demanded a deed from Bird which was refused.
The answer and cross-complaint of Bird show that $750 was due, from Chapman to Bird for the land. That when he sold to Chapman he made no deed, but a bond due on demand for a deed. That he took Chapman’s note for $3,297.50, receiving cash, $702.50, the whole consideration being $4,000. Subsequently Bird borrowed $4,000 of Chapman, and gave his note with other signers, secured by mortgage. Thereafter.-Chapman surrendered the note andto.ok C. T. Bird’s (another person), for $702.50, but declined to take up his own note of $3,297.50, as he wished defendant to hold it and the land, as he, defendant was to aid with advances, in the settlement of a divorce suit, between Chapman and wife, in which suit Bird did thereafter become security to the wife, Hannah Chapman, for $2,000, which when due, he paid, and held the land as security. The $2,000 he alleges has never been repaid. Subsequently Hannah Chapman sued Bird for the $4,000 note, claiming that John Chapman, co-defendant, had assigned it to her when she was a femme sole, and to foreclose the mortgage. John Bacon-also brought a similar action. Bird answered in both, afterwards, Chapman denying that be bad ever bought the land' of Bird, and denying that be bad Bird’s bond for a deed; and claiming that Bird owed him borrowed money, defendant Bird negotiated for a settlement, and agreed with Cottle, with the knowledge of Packard, respondent, that Bird should pay Cottle $500 to release the land from the attachment; but as the bond might come to light and trouble Bird, it was agreed, of which Packard had knowledge and notice, —between Cottle and Bird, that a sale of the land should be had under execution, to shut out Chapman’s interest at which Cottle should not bid, but Bird should be permitted to buy it in.
That Cottle was agent for Packard who’ acquiesced in this arrangement as appellant believes. Belying on this arrangement, Bird settled the suits, paid Cottle’s attorney $500, and employed him to bid to that amount. At the sale Cottle violated his agreement, bid $1,000, and bought the property; be received the certificate and assigned it to respondent Packard, in order to defraud appellant. He prays for judgment that Packard be declared his trustee, and be required to deed the land to appellant on payment of the agreed sum of $500, and costs of sale.
Rhodes, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court,- Ceoce-ett, J., Sprague, J., and Wallace, J., concurring:
The appeal was taken from the judgment alone. The plaintiff objects, under rule thirteen, to certain portions of the transcript. The objection must be overruled, as to the order sustaining the demurrer to the cross-complaint, and the bill of exceptions, because they properly constitute a part of the judgment roll. The motion to strike out portions of the answer will also be retained, as it is referred to in the bill of exceptions — one of the points therein saved, being the order sustaining the [383]motion. Tbe statute does not expressly provide that an interlocutory judgment shall constitute a portion of the judgment roll, but as such judgments often determine the rights of the respective parties, there is a manifest projeriety in inserting them in the judgment roll. We are of the opinion that an interlocutory judgment comes within the spirit and meaning of the statutory requirement, that the judgment shall constitute a portion of the judgment roll.
There are several of the grounds of demurrer which we cannot consider, for the reason urged by the plaintiff — that it cannot be ascertained from the transcript, to what portions of the cross-complaint the several grounds respeetively apply. Distinct portions are demurred to, and such portions are described by reference to the pages and lines of the pleadings; but there is nothing in the transcript to indicate to what portions the demurrer applied.
The defendant, Bird, in order to maintain his claim to affirmative relief, is compelled to rely upon the contract entered into between Mm and Cottle, in respect to the purchase of the interest of Chapman in the premises — at the sale under the execution issued upon the judgment of Cottle against Chapman. It was, among other things, agreed between them that Cottle would not bid at the sale, but that Bird should be allowed to purchase Chapman’s interest in the lands. The direct effect of that branch of the agreement, was to prevent bidding at the sale under the execution; and it cannot be doubted' that such an agreement is contrary to public policy, and therefore void. This question properly arises on the demurrer, on the ground that the cross-complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the plaintiff; and the demurrer was correctly sustained on that ground. The whole contract being vitiated by this agreement, the- defendant was left without any cause of action against the plaintiff, as the assignee of the Cottle judgment, and the purchaser at the execution sale.
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