Montgomery v. Whiting

Appeal from tbe District Court of tbe Second District, Lassen County..

Tbe facts are stated in tbe opinion.

First — Plaintiff being in possession as owner of tbe premises, and baying declared bis intention to pre-empt tbe same at tbe time of tbe execution of the Sheriff's deed, and tbe rendition of tbe judgment in ejectment, stood in tbe relation of a trustee to defendant, as to any after acquired title to tbe premises, and any such after acquired title would enure to tbe benefit of defendant. Tbe facts present clearly a case of constructive trust. By bis declaration of intention to pre-empt, plaintiff connected himself with tbe. United States title, and being indebted to defendant, tbe judgment of the County Court upon that indebtedness, tbe sale of tbe premises occupied by plaintiff, tbe execution of tbe Sheriff’s deed under tbe sale, conveying to defendant, all tbe right, title, and interest of plaintiff to tbe tract of land in dispute, and afterwards tbe judgment of ejectment recorded in favor of defendant for tbe same premises, conclusively force tbe plaintiff into tbe position of a trustee bolding tbe legal title for tbe benefit of bis trustor, tbe defendant. Defendant was, and is, tbe equitable owner of tbe land possessed and improved by plaintiff at tbe time of tbe execution of tbe Sheriff’s deed and tbe entry of tbe judgment of ejectment. If so, then plaintiff became tbe trustee of tbe equitable owner. (Wilson v. Castro, 31 Cal. 436; Estrada v. Murphy, 19 Cal. 272; Emeric v. Penniman, 26 Id. 124; Bludioorih v. Lake, 33 Id. 262-3.)

Second — Plaintiff is estopped by tbe judgment and tbe deed from asserting title now, in prejudice of defendant’s rights. Tbe acts of plaintiff were sufficient to create an equitable estoppel. (Davis v. Davis, 26 Cal. 39.)

A quit-claim deed, does not operate as an estoppel or create a trust as to subsequently acquired title.

At tbe moment of tbe completion of tbe Sheriff's sale and tbe execution of tbe quit-claim Sheriff’s deed (defendant having bid tbe whole amount of bis judgment, at tbe sale, and having accepted such deed), tbe relation of debtor and creditor ceased to exist; and there was no obligation, legal, equitable or moral, existing on tbe part of plaintiff to defendant to protect defendant in tbe property which be bad acquired by such purchase, or which could prevent plaintiff from afterwards acquiring title to tbe land in question, or from which a trust could be implied by any possible construction of tbe authorities cited by appellant. (Clark v. Baker, 14 Cal. 632.)

It will be found upon examination, that in each of tbe cases cited by appellant, where tbe Court announced tbe existence of a trust, it is where tbe cestui que trust bad an actual equitable title to, and interest in tbe land prior to tbe acquisition of. tbe legal title, by tbe trustee. Such is not tbe case in tbe present suit, and, consequently, tbe authorities do not apply.