Duffy v. Hobson
Before: Bhodes, Expressed, Wallace
Synopsis
Appeal from the District Court of tbe Sixth. District, Sacramento County.
Action to enforce performance of a written contract of sale of certain lots in tbe city of Sacrameuto, executed by tbe agent of tbe defendant, in tbe name of bis principal under a verbal authority to sell, and for damages for failure to perform tbe contract. Judgment was for plaintiff. Defendant moved for a new trial, which was denied; and from tbe judgment and the order denying defendant’s motion for a new trial, this appeal is taken.
Tbe other facts are stated in tbe opinion.
Tbe Court erred in admitting in evidence tbe contract made by Atkins in Hobson’s name, with Duffy, for tbe sale of tbe lots in question.
1st. It was not stamped according to law. (13 U. S. Statutes at Large, Sec. 170, p. 298.)
2d. There was no testimony tending to prove Atkins’ authority to make tbe contract given in evidence. (Coleman v. Garsequez, 18 Barb. 60; Vanhorn v. Frick, 6 Serg. and K. 90; Clark v. Graham, 6 Wheat. 577.)
Tbe provisions of tbe United States statute in relation to stamps, do not apply to tbe Courts of tbe several States.
Tbe language of tbe enactment is only that no instruments or documents not duly stamped, “shall be admitted or used as evidence in any Court until tbe requisite stamp shall be affixed.” This provision can have full operation and effect, if construed as intended to apply to those Courts only which have been established under tbe Constitution of tbe United States and by Acts of Congress, over which tbe Federal Legislature can legitimately exercise control, and to which they can properly prescribe rules regulating tbe course of justice and tbe mode of administering justice. (Carpenter eb al. v. SnelUng, 77 Mass. 457-8, and note at bottom of page.)
Tbe doctrine is now firmly established in Massachusetts that no stamp is required for the introduction of any paper or document in any of tbe Courts of that State; and we respectfully suggest that if such is tbe law. it should be at once promulgated in this State.
In other States, Courts have held that an objection to a contract or other instrument that it is not stamped as required by tbe Bevenue Laws is unavailing, unless tbe party objecting proves that tbe stamp was omitted with tbe intent to evade tbe Act of Congress. (Garland v. Lane, 46 N. H. 245; Fifietd v. Glose, 15 Mich. 505; Trull v. Morton, 12 Allen, 369; Hitchcock v. Sawyer, 39 Yt. 412; JBébee v. Hutton, 47 Barb. 187; Neto Haven and Northampton Co. v. Quintará, 5 Abbott Pr. N. S. 128.)
Upon tbe question of damages for breach of contracts of this character, we refer tbe Court to: Hopldm v. Lee, (6 Wheaton, 109, 118;) Hillv. Hobart, (16 Maine, 164;) Wa/r-renv. Wheder, (21 Maine, 484;) Baldwins. Munn, (2 Wend. 400); Ahrens v. Adler, (33 Cal. 608.)
Wallace, J., delivered tbe opinion of tbe Court, Crockett, J., Temple, J., and Sprague, J., concurring:-
[243]On the trial in tbe District Court, tbe plaintiff offered in evidence a written contract, by tbe terms of wbicb be claimed tbat tbe defendant bad sold and agreed to convey to bim certain lots in tbe city of Sacramento. Tbis contract was not stamped with United States revenue stamps, denoting tbe payment of tax to tbe Federal Government; and upon tbat ground tbe defendant objected to its introduction as evidence, and bas renewed tbe objection bere. "We think tbe objection not well taken. Tbe Act of Congress cited in its support provides tbat such a contract as tbe one now under consideration, unless stamped in tbe manner therein required, shall not be “recorded or admitted or used as evidence in any Court,” etc. Tbe Act, however, does not in terms extend to proceedings bad under tbe laws of tbe State, and does not, on its face, import any interference with those laws.
Upon tbe settled rules of interpretation, it must be construed to embrace only proceedings bad, and acts done, in public offices and Courts established under tbe Constitution of the United States, and by authority of Acts of Congress framed in pursuance thereof.
But, if tbe Act of Congress under consideration bad in terms embraced tbe State Courts within its provisions, and bad enacted tbat upon a trial had in one of those Courts, a contract or other instrument of evidence, otherwise admissible, should not be admitted in evidence except upon compliance with its provisions, it would be our duty to declare its provisions in that respect null and void.
Congress bas no constitutional authority to legislate concerning tbe rules of evidence administered in tbe Courts of tbis State, nor to affix conditions or limitations upon wbicb those rules are to be applied and enforced; nor can it rightfully convert those Courts into tax gatherers for tbe benefit of tbe Federal Government, nor charge them with tbe duty of inquiring whether or not tbe revenue laws of tbe United States have been observed, or of investigating into tbe motives of parties in omitting to affix revenue stamps to tbe contracts they may have made. Tbe case of Hallock [244]
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