Ryan v. Tomlinson

California Supreme Court Jul 1, 1870 No. No. 2 121Published

Before: Crockett

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Holding. The court held that evidence of an executed parol agreement for the exchange of land is admissible to validate a conveyance, even if the underlying court judgment authorizing that conveyance was void. A stranger to the transaction without privity cannot invoke the Statute of Frauds to challenge an executed agreement that the original parties have ratified.

Issues

Whether evidence of an executed parol agreement for the exchange of land is admissible to validate a conveyance despite a prior void judgment.
Whether a stranger to a transaction can invoke the Statute of Frauds to challenge an executed agreement between other parties.
Whether a prior appellate reversal and remand precludes the introduction of new evidence at a second trial.

Disposition. reversed and remanded

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“But the parol agreement having been fully executed, the Statute of Frauds would afford no relief, even though Brewer himself was seeking its aid.”

Synopsis

Statute op Frauds A verbal agreement for an exchange of real property which has been carried into effect by the execution of proper conveyances in pursuance of the agreement, is not void under the Statute of Frauds.

Idem.—A mero intruder on real property having no privity with the former owner, cannot invoke the aid of the Statute of Frauds for the protection of such owner.

Deed—Recital in__A recital in a conveyance by the Trustees of a town that it was made in obedience to a judgment of the County Court, which judgment was subsequently decided to be void, does not invalidate the deed if it contain operative words of conveyance sufficient to transfer the title.

Idem__The recitals touching the void judgment may he rejected as surplusage and the deed remain a valid operative conveyance, which cannot he impeached by a stranger to the transaction, not in privity with any of the parties.

Evidence—Admissibility op on New Trial.—Parties to an action on a new trial are not precluded by the decision of this Court on a former appeal from proving facts which were not before the Court, and upon whose legal effect there was no adjudication on that appeal, nor from introducing new proofs in support of the complaint or defense, as the case may he.

Judgment op Reversal—Epfect op.—The effect of the order “judgment reversed and cause remanded ” is only to set aside the judgment that a new trial may ho held, unless it is apparent from the opinion of the Court that the adjudication was intended to be a final disposition of the cause.

Crockett, J., delivered the opinion of the Court:

On the former appeal in this case (31 Cal. 11) the only points decided were : First—That the judgment of the County Court, ordering the Trustees of the town to convey the lot in controversy to Duff, Avas void, for the reason that,' before the rendering of the judgment, the plaintiffs in the action, by an order entered of record, had abandoned their claim to the lot and withdraAvn from the contest. We held that this put an end to the action, and that, therefore, the cause Avas not pending Avhen the Court rendered the judgment. Second— That the stipulation signed by the respective counsel of Duff and Brewer was inoperative to give vitality to the judgment, [644]Avhich was void for the reason above stated. Third—That said stipulation was insufficient-to authorize and validate the conveyance from the Trustees to Duff. But, on that appeal, there was nothing before us, except the action of the Trustees • awarding the lot to Brewer, the proceedings .in the County Court, including the stipulation of the counsel, and the. conveyance to Duff made by the Trustees in accordance with, the judgment. But, on the second trial, from the judg.ment in which this appeal is taken, it was proved that the stipulation of the counsel, in virtue of which the judgment of the County Court was rendered, was the result of a com- . promise agreed upon between Duff and Brewer, to the effect that in consideration of a conveyance to be made .by Duff to - Brewer, of another lot, Brewer waived his claim to the lot in controversy, and consented that it be conveyed by the Trustees to Duff; and the stipulations of the counsel, and the judgment rendered in pursuance thereof, were intended by the parties to effectuate this agreement on the part of Brewer. , It Avas further proved that Duff had fully performed the agree- . ment on his part, by conveying to Brewer the lot Avhich he had agreed to convey. This proof was excluded by the Court, on the motion of the defendant, and this ruling is ' assigned by the plaintiff as the chief ■ error relied upon on this appeal. We think the evidence Avas clearly admissible. In effect, it established an executed parol agreement between Duff and Brewer, whereby they agreed to an exchange of lots. Duff has performed his part of it, by conveying to Brewer the lot agreed upon, and Brewer has also performed, on his - part, by causing the Trustees to convey to Duff the lot in - contest, and has ratified the transaction by deeds made since the commencement of this action. Duff and-Brewer are both content with the result, and neither complains of any wrong in the premises. -We do not comprehend on what theory ■ the defendant, who, so far as . the record shows, is a mere . intruder, without title or color of title, can be heard to . say that -the agreement between Duff and BreAver, for an exchange of lots-, is void, under the Statute of Frauds. So long as the parties to the transaction are content with it, it is not for an intruder on the property, having no privity with Brewer, to

Ryan v. Tomlinson

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